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In this dissertation I study three problems in market design: the allocation of re-
sources to schools using deferred acceptance algorithms, the demand reduction of
employees on centralized labor markets, and the alleviation of trac congestion. I
show how institutional and behavioral considerations specic to each problem can
alleviate several practical limitations faced by current solutions. For the case of
trac congestion, I show experimentally that the proposed solution is eective.
In Chapter 1, I investigate how school districts could assign resources to schools
when it is desirable to provide stable assignments. An assignment is stable if there
is no student currently assigned to a school that would prefer to be assigned to a
dierent school that would admit him if it had the resources. Current assignment
algorithms assume resources are xed. I show how simple modications to these
algorithms produce stable allocations of resources and students to schools.
In Chapter 2, I show how the negotiation of salaries within centralized labor mar-
kets using deferred acceptance algorithms eliminates the incentives of the hiring
rms to strategically reduce their demand. It is well-known that it is impossible
to eliminate these incentives for the hiring rms in markets without negotiation of
salaries.
Chapter 3 investigates how to achieve an ecient distribution of trac congestion
on a road network. Trac congestion is the product of an externality: drivers do
not consider the cost they impose on other drivers by entering a road. In theory,
Pigouvian prices would solve the problem. In practice, however, these prices face
two important limitations: i) the information required to calculate these prices is
unavailable to policy makers and ii) these prices would eectively be new taxes that
would transfer resources from the public to the government. I show how to con-
struct congestion prices that retrieve the required information from the drivers and
do not transfer resources to the government. I circumvent the limitations of Pigou-
vian prices by assuming that individuals make some mistakes when selecting routes
and have a tendency towards truth-telling. Both assumptions are very robust obser-
vations in experimental economics.
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Chapter 1: Resources and Constraints in Matching Markets
Abstract. A matching model is developed in which several matching markets can
be analyzed simultaneously as a single matching market with constraints. This model
is capable of dealing with complex allocation problems such as deciding funding in
school choice problems or regional caps in residents matching. In this model a sta-
ble allocation must resist deviations within markets and across markets. We oer
a strategy-proof-for-doctors mechanism capable of simultaneously selecting a mar-
ket and an allocation in that market. The allocation selected is shown to be stable
(within market and across markets) and ecient.
In the United States, public school systems are increasingly adopting a new fund-
ing strategy where funding follows the child to the school he or she attends. A
weighted student formula (WSF) at the school district level is its most common
manifestation. Under WSF resources are allocated to students, rather than to schools
and programs, based on their specic needs. The WSF ensures more funding is al-
located to students with more expensive educational needs. Specic weights are
tailored to meet student needs in every district. In Boston, for example, weights are
distributed across eight categories: grade, poverty, disabilities, continued disabil-
ities, interrupted formal education, English learners, risk students and vocational
students. WSF's are a modern solution to a dicult allocation problem in school-
ing: funding to schools and programs must depend not only the number, but the
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identity and needs of every student. The WSF strategy is a reminder that all school
districts, using WSF's or not, face two complex allocation decisions: resources to
schools and students to schools.
The second allocation problem has been studied successfully in recent years. Fol-
lowing the seminal paper of Abdulkadirouglu and Sönmez (2003), a lot of attention
has been devoted to several aspects of the admission process; including manipula-
bility,1 eciency2 and diversity.3 These eorts have provided school districts across
the nation with tools to improve their admission systems. For example, the NY and
Boston public school systems now use a version of the deferred acceptance algo-
rithm proposed in the literature.4 However, in all previous models, it is assumed
that resources assigned to schools are xed, leaving the rst allocation problem
unattended. Current designs are ecient only when there is absolutely no freedom
in allocating resources to schools.
In this paper, we make progress towards a unied solution to both allocation prob-
lems when the stability and eciency of the nal allocation are important. In or-
der to gain insight about the new economic phenomena present in this extended
model, consider the prototypical school choice problem. In a particular school dis-
trict, there are several school programs; some of them may share buildings, labo-
ratories, dining rooms and buses, but most importantly all of them share the same
nancial budget. There is a common pool of applicants. However, not all applicants
have the same needs. For instance, some may require special facilities or instruc-
tors. Two competing procedures suggest themselves as possible solutions to these
1Abdulkadiro§lu et al. (2011); Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2009); Ergin and Sönmez (2006); Hateld
and Kojima (2009); Kojima and Pathak (2009); Pathak and Sönmez (2008); Sönmez (1997)
2Aygün and Sönmez (2013); Balinski and Sönmez (1999); Dur et al. (2013); Erdil and Ergin
(2008); Ergin (2002)
3Abdulkadiro§lu (2005); Kominers and Sönmez (2013)




First, one could allocate and x resources to schools in advance, i.e. before match-
ing students to schools, in order to determine the number and kind of seats in ev-
ery school. Denote as market f a market with xed resources. Assume some stable
allocation is chosen in market f . Hence in market f , the nal allocation is individ-
ually rational and no blocking pair exists. However, when potentially transferable
resources are introduced to the model, the stability of the chosen allocation is arti-
cial. It is possible that a student would like to move to a school dierent from the
one he or she has been assigned and that school would like to admit the student,
but currently has no resources to do so. Furthermore, the student is using resources
in the assigned school and those resources are transferable, in some degree, to the
other school. If resources are moved from one school to the other then, call this
new market g. In market g, the chosen allocation would not be stable. One possi-
ble solution is to sequentially satisfy all would-be blocking pairs, however, it is not
a suitable solutions since it is well know that even in xed-resources environments
it leads to problems.5 Furthermore, it is not clear whether there is a market and an
allocation in that market capable of eliminating all blocking pairs within markets
and across markets. We extend the concept of stability to allow for inter-market
blocking pairs and show that, under suitable conditions, a stable allocation exists.
In principle, it would be possible to calculate a stable allocation in every market
and then compare them all to choose one that is stable across markets. Such pro-
cedure is computationally very expensive. Moreover, it is highly unlikely for such a
procedure to have nice incentive properties. Hence we focus our attention on nd-
ing a stable allocation and its market simultaneously.
Second, suppose the allocation of resources across schools is not xed , and every
school decides independently, subject to a matching process, the number and iden-
5See Roth and Sotomayor (1992)
3
tity of admitted students. In this admission process a new economic force would be
in play: the admission of one student by a school directly aects the admission ca-
pacity of all other schools by reducing the common pool of resources, i.e. there are
externalities in the resources dimension. Hence some coordination between schools
is required in the admission process. We develop a new algorithm capable of solv-
ing the externalities produced in the admission process using property rights as the
coordination device. Suppose all feasible allocations in this market are denoted f ,g,
etc. Every feasible allocation implicitly assigns resources to every school. Suppose
f assigns students d1, ..., d5 to school h, then it is possible to assign school h with
property rights over ve seats and inform all other schools to admit students consis-
tent with h having ve seats. We show that the assignment of property rights can
be done simultaneously with the matching process and show that, under suitable
conditions, it produces a stable and strategy-proof mechanism.
As hinted by the terminology used above, studying several markets and a single
market with constraints is essentially the same. Consider for example a collection
of markets f , g, h,... and then produce a single market with constraints where f ,
g, h,... represent the constraints that must be satised. The process can be done in
the opposite direction. We exploit this insight and the ideas from both approaches
outlined above to produce a unied framework and oer a mechanism that is stable
(within and across markets), ecient and strategy-proof for students.
Our design is based on the model of matching with contracts of Hateld and Mil-
grom (2005). There are three essential components: i) a set of feasible sets of con-
tracts (a set of markets), ii) a central authority called the matchmaker and iii) the
relevant concept of stability under constraints (stability within and across markets).
We follow the conventional terminology of referring to market participants as doc-
tors and hospitals.
When constraints are present, the (tentative) admission decisions of one hospital af-
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fect other hospitals through the constraints binding them together. This externality-
like eect can only be eciently resolved by the matchmaker. Even in the simplest
economy with externalities there is a need for a government to restore eciency,
usually achieved using: taxes, quotas and property rights. The rst two require the
government to know the ecient level of activity in the market, while the third
does not. We introduce the matchmaker and provide it with a way to establish
property rights over feasible allocations in order to achieve eciency. The match-
maker will guarantee both the feasibility and the eciency of the nal match using
property rights. Matchmakers exist in real matching markets with constraints (mar-
kets where there is exibility in the allocation of resources). Consider the school
choice example above: an authority actually exists and it has been making deci-
sions that allocate property rights over resources. We include this important real
market participant in the model.
The third piece of our construction is the relevant concept of stability. In a model
with no constraints a stable allocation is an individually rational set of contracts
with no blocking sets, i.e. no hospital and group of doctors is willing to reject their
current contracts and implement contracts by themselves. We extend this deni-
tion and deem a set of contracts stable if it is i) conditionally stable (given property
rights) and ii) non-extendable in property rights (no resources are wasted). Our
denition is a natural extension of stability without constraints and reduces to it as
constraints are removed. Other models with constraints have developed their own
notions of stability with constraints but they usually do not reduce to the standard
denition as constraints are removed.6
Models of matching with constrains have been developed since Abdulkadirouglu
and Sönmez (2003) introduced the school choice problem with armative action.
They modied the standard Gale-Shapley algorithm to allow for maximum quan-
6See for example, Kamada and Kojima (2013) .
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tities of certain types of students. Kamada and Kojima (2013) recently developed
a model of matching to nd ecient matching of medical graduates to residency
programs in Japan. In their model, there are regional constraints limiting the max-
imum number of doctors hirable in certain regions. They introduced a matchmaker
to assign property rights, which in their model specify the maximum number of res-
idents a hospital can hire. Furthermore, they showed that the matchmaker prefer-
ences have to satisfy a substitutability condition for a stable allocation to exist and
to achieve strategy-proofness for doctors. Our model extends these models in two
important ways: i) we allow for complex constraints and ii) we extend the domain
of admissible preferences from responsive to substitutable preferences. In order to
consider complex constraints we introduce the concept of property rights (con-
tracts from which the doctor dimension has been eliminated) and extend the do-
main of hospitals choice functions to include not only a set of contracts, but also
a set of property rights. We introduce the contract replacement property into
the model to manage substitutions of property rights. When the contract replace-
ment property is satised, hospitals are only willing to substitute contracts with the
same property rights, substitution of contracts with dierent property rights is pos-
sible, but must be induced by constraints and not the unconstrained preferences.
Finally, we introduce the consistency of choice property to extend admissible
preference from responsive to substitutable preferences. When a hospital satises
the consistency of choice property, it never rejects a contract that was previously
held because its property rights have been increased.
In a recent paper, Kominers and Sönmez (2013) studied a model of matching for
diversity with the objective of achieving a certain distribution of students, eec-
tively introducing constraints and externalities in the way seats can choose students
(seats being the relevant decision units since each seat could have dierent prefer-
ences). However, in their model, externalities not only aect resources endowed to
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seats; they aect the identity of admissible students. They dealt with this problem
by directly constructing schools choice functions, a suitable solution in their envi-
ronment, but not in a market where hospitals represent agents with preferences.
However, the mechanics of both models are similar. In both models, there is no sta-
ble allocation that is preferred by all members of one side of the market. Hence, an
exogenous device is introduced to the model. In their case, a doctors precedence
and in our case a matchmaker. In our language, precedence grants property rights
to doctors while the matchmaker grants property rights to hospitals. Both devices
make decisions whenever agents' preferences do not agree.
1.1 An example
Suppose a school district wants to assign 4 students d1, d2, d3, d4 to 2 schools h1, h2.
The school district has some exibility regarding the funding it provides to each
school. Schools produce seats with the funding their receive. For simplicity, suppose
the school district can choose between (q1, q2) = (2, 0) and (q1, q2) = (1, 2), where qi
is the maximum number of students hi can admit. This could happen if it is more
expensive to produce a seat in h1 than in h2 because of dierentiated investments
already in place. For example, h1 could need to build a classroom for the second
seat whereas other seats only require to cover variable costs.
Suppose this district uses the Gale-Shapley algorithm to allocate its students and
preferences (schools' priorities) are as follows:
d1 : h2, h1
h1 : d3, d4 d2 : h2, h1
h2 : d1, d2, d3, d4 d3 : h1, h2
d4 : h2

















Figure 1.1: Unique stable matches
Notice that (q1, q2) = (1, 2) Pareto dominates (q1, q2) = (2, 0) both when both
schools and students' preference matter (as if this example represented a labor mar-
ket) and when only students's preferences matter (as in a school choice problem).
Suppose the school district cares about eciency and would like to select a Pareto
ecient stable matching. In this example one-sided and two-sided Pareto eciency
coincide for simplicity. How can the school district decide which of the two assign-
ments to select?
Suppose the school district decides to fund schools according to their tentative ad-
mission. If schools are free to admit as many students they want, the rst round of








Figure 1.2: First tentative assignment
Notice that the number of seats required in each school to support this assignment
is (q1, q2) = (1, 3). At this stage, when some preferences have been revealed, it
seems reasonable to select (q1, q2) = (1, 2) rather than (q1, q2) = (2, 0) since set-
ting (1, 2) would produce less rejections (hence keeping more students in their rst
choice) than (0, 2). Suppose the school district does so and lets the Gale-Shapley
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algorithm to continue. Then the nal assignment would be the optimal one.
This paper extends the previous ideas by generalizing the keeping-more-students-
in-their-rst-choice idea in the following way. Consider the set of tentative admis-
sions {(h1, d3), (h2, d1), (h2, d2), (h2, d4)} and drop the doctor dimension to pro-
duce the following multiset7 {(h1), (h2), (h2), (h2)}. Notice that the assignment
(q1, q2) = (1, 2) can be represented by {(h1), (h2), (h2)} and (q1, q2) = (2, 0) by
{(h1), (h1)}. Notice that {(h1), (h2), (h2)} is a sub-multiset of the multiset of tenta-
tive assignments while {(h1), (h1)} is not. Thus {(h1), (h2), (h2)} should be chosen.
If assignments (or tentative assignments) had specic transaction characteristics,
they could be represented by a set of contracts of the form
{(h1, d3, s13), (h2, d1, s21), (h2, d2, s22), (h2, d4, s24)}, where sij represent the transac-
tional characteristics of the particular match in question. In this case, removing the
doctor dimension would produce a multiset of the form {(h1, s13), (h2, s21), (h2, s22), (h2, s24)}.
In this paper, elements of the form (hi, s) are called property rights.
1.2 Model
Matching models have been successfully used in many applications where transfers
and prices cannot be used to signal market participants the relative value and cost
of dierent allocations. Classical examples are matching doctors to hospitals for
residency programs, students to colleges and workers to rms.
1.2.1 Feasible Sets of Contracts
Throughout the paper, capital letters will represent both sets and their cardinality.
If Y is a set and w is an element, we denote Y ∪ {w} by Y w. The set of doctors is
denoted by D and the set of hospitals by H with typical elements d and h, respec-
7A multiset is a list of elements in which repetition of elements is possible, but order does not
matter.
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tively. We assume there is a nite set of contracts X . A contract x ∈ X species
all payo relevant conditions between a doctor and a hospital. In general, if S is
the set of conditions that can be described in the market, every element of S could
specify a salary, a workload, a series of tasks, etc, then X ⊂ D × H × S. Through-
out the paper we do not exploit the product structure of the set of contracts and
we only use the fact that every contract species a doctor and a hospital. It will be
assumed that doctors can sign at most one contract and hospitals can sign multiple
contracts, but at most one with a particular doctor.
It is usually assumed that any contract in X can be signed independently (the only
restriction being that doctors can sign at most one contract), i.e. if contract x1
names doctor d1 and hospital h1 they can sign it if both agree on its terms, regard-
less of the contracts signed between say hospital h2 and doctor d2. However, when
there are constraints, the signature of a contract by a hospital h1 may prevent the
signature of other contracts naming dierent hospitals or doctors. As mentioned
in the introduction, when constraints are present there is an externality-like ef-
fect when agents sign contracts. For example, consider a Mathematics department
and Computer Science department that share a building, classrooms and budget.
Without a pre-allocation of resources, the admission decisions made by the math
department directly aect the ability to admit students of the computer science de-
partment. In the resident matching environment, if two hospitals share a common
regional cap, a hospital can prevent other from signing contracts that might violate
the cap.
A set of contracts f ⊂ X is feasible if all contracts in f can be signed simultane-
ously. Let F be the set of all such sets. It is assumed that if a particular set of con-
tracts is feasible, then all of its subsets are also feasible, i.e. f ∈ F and g ⊂ f
implies g ∈ F . It will also be assumed that no contract is trivial X = ∪
F
f . Both
conditions are very weak, the rst requires free disposal of contracts and the sec-
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ond only establishes that the model should consider contracts that could be feasible
in at least one instance. For notational convenience F will be described only by
its maximal members. In addition, we impose the following condition called doc-
tor independence. Let f ∈ F and let g be a set of contracts identical to f where
the doctors names have been changed and no doctor is named more than once. F is
doctor independent if and only if f ∈ F and g ⊂ X implies g ∈ F . Doctor indepen-
dence precludes restrictions from excluding certain doctors from matchings allowed
to some other doctors. The following examples show how feasibility constraints are
implemented in the model.
Example 1.1. Consider a market with two hospitals h1 and h2 and two doctors d1
and d2 with the constraint that only one contract can be signed. Then set of con-
tracts would be:
X = {(h1, d1), (h1, d2), (h2, d1), (h2, d2)}
and the set of feasible sets would be:
f1 = {(h1, d1)} f2 = {(h1, d2)}
f3 = {(h2, d1)} f4 = {(h2, d2)}
F = {f1, f2, f3, f4}
The following example shows that constraints could include contractual characteris-
tics.
Example 1.2. A school district has two schools h1 and h2 and three students d1,
d2 and d3. The district can nance either two seats in h1 and one in h2 or three
seats in h2 and oer students a stipend of s.
X = {(h1, d1), (h1, d2), (h1, d3), (h2, d1, s), (h2, d2, s), (h2, d3, s), (h2, d1), (h2, d2), (h2, d3)}
and the set of feasible sets would be:
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f1 = {(h2, d1, s), (h2, d2, s), (h2, d3, s)}
f2 = {(h1, d1), (h1, d2), (h2, d3)}
f3 = {(h1, d1), (h2, d2), (h1, d3)}
f4 = {(h2, d1), (h1, d2), (h1, d3)}
F = {f1, f2, f3, f4}
In order to dene property rights we need to introduce the concept of multisets.
Multisets are generalized sets and are intermediate objects between sets and or-
dered tuples. In a multiset the order does not matter, but there could be many
copies of the same element. For our purposes the following examples display the
meaning of simple operations using multisets.
{1, 1, 1, 3} ∩ {1, 1, 2} = {1, 1}
{1, 1} ∪ {1, 2} = {1, 1, 2}
{1, 1} ⊂ {1, 1, 1, 2}
|{1, 1}| = 2
{1, 1} ] {1, 2} = {1, 1, 1, 2}
Every f ∈ F induces property rights f ∗ for hospitals named in f . For every f ⊂ X
let f ∗ be the multiset formed by all elements of f after dropping the doctors di-
mension. For example, if f = {(h1, d1, s), (h1, d2), (h1, d4), (h2, d3, p)} then f ∗ =
{(h1, s), (h1), (h1), (h2, p)}. Let F∗ be the set of all sets of property rights. We in-
troduce some standard notation used throughout the paper.
For any agent a ∈ D ∪ H and set of contracts Y ⊂ X , set of feasible contracts
f ∈ F , or set of rights f ∗ ∈ F∗, let Ya, fa, f ∗a be the set (multiset) of elements
naming agent a, respectively.
For any set of contracts Y ⊂ X (including singletons), set of feasible contracts f ∈
F , or set of rights f ∗ ∈ F∗, let H(Y ), H(f), H(f ∗) be the set of hospitals named
12
in Y ,f , f ∗ respectively. Let D(Y ), D(f) be the set of doctors named in Y and f ,
respectively. Analogously A(·) is the set of agents.
Each doctor d has preferences d over Xd ∪ {∅} and is characterized by a single-
valued choice function Cd(X) = maxd{x ∈ Xd ∪ {∅}}. Let Rd(X) = X − Cd(X)
be the set of rejected contracts when the set X is oered. It will be assumed that
preferences are strict.8 Let CD(X) = ∪
d∈D
Cd(X) and RD(X) = X − CD(X).
Each hospital h has preferences h over 2Xh . It will be assumed that hospital pref-
erences are strict.9 However, departing from the original model of matching with
contracts, hospital preferences will be characterized by a choice function with two
arguments, the rst being a set of contracts and the second a multiset of property
rights. Intuitively, a hospital will be oered a series of choice problems and it will
choose its most preferred chosen sent among those problems. Formally, Ch(X, f ∗) =
maxh{Y ⊂ Xh | x, y ∈ Y ⇒ D(x) 6= D(y), Y ∗ ⊂ f ∗}. Let Rh(X, f ∗) =
X − Ch(X, f ∗) be the set of rejected contracts. Let Ch(X) = Ch(X,X∗) and
Rh(X) = X − Ch(X). Let CH(X) = ∪
H
Ch(X) and RH(X) = X − CH(X).
In this model an allocation is a set of contracts, as it determines payos for all par-
ticipants in the market. We study stable allocations. Intuitively, a stable allocation
is such that no participant would like to unilaterally reject some of the contracts he
holds or would be able to nd a partner to sign a mutually agreeable contract. In
matching problems without constraint stability is usually dened as follows:
Denition 1.1. The set of contracts X is unconstrained stable if:





ii) It is unblocked: there is no hospital h and set of contracts Y 6= Ch(X) such that:
8It could also be assumed that Cd satises Cd(X) ∈ Y and Y ⊂ X implies Cd(X) = Cd(Y ).
This property has been called consistency by Kamada and Kojima (2013) and irrelevance of re-
jected contracts by Aygün and Sönmez (2013) and assumes a regular behavior when breaking
indierences among contracts.
9It could also be assumed that CH is such that CH(X) ∈ Y and Y ⊂ X implies CH(X) =
CH(Y )
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Y = Ch(X ∪ Y ) = ∪
d∈D(Y )
Cd(X ∪ Y )
When there are constraints there is an obvious problem with the previous deni-
tion, i.e. it is not guaranteed that a particular unconstrained stable set of contracts
is feasible:
Example 1.3. Consider the regional cap example with feasible set given by:
F = {{(h1, d1)}, {(h1, d2)}, {(h2, d1)}, {(h2, d2)}}
Consider the following preferences:
h1 : d1, d2 d1 : h2, h1
h2 : d2, d1 d2 : h1, h2
X = {(h1, d2), (h2, d1)} is unconstrained stable but infeasible.
The previous example shows that the concept of unconstrained stability cannot be
readily applied to the problem of matching with constraints. One might hope that
adding a feasibility requirement would suce to restore the concept. However, the
following denition and example show that we need to restrict unconstrained stabil-
ity even more.
Denition 1.2. The set of contracts X is constrained stable if:
i) It is feasible: X ∈ F





iii) It is unblocked: there is no hospital h and set of contracts Y 6= Ch(X) such
that:
Y = Ch(X ∪ Y ) = ∪
d∈D(Y )
Cd(X ∪ Y )
Y ∪XA(X)\A(Y ) ∈ F
An allocation is constrained stable if i) it is feasible, ii) individually rational and ii)
there is no blocking hospital and set of doctors that could implement a deviation
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by themselves (taking restrictions into account). The following example shows that
adding feasibility is not enough.
Example 1.4. As in the previous example, assume that the feasible set is given by:
F = {{(h1, d1)}, {(h1, d2)}, {(h2, d1)}, {(h2, d2)}}
and that preferences are as follows:
h1 : d1, d2 d1 : h2, h1
h2 : d2, d1 d2 : h1, h2
There are four candidate sets that satisfy feasibility: X1 = {(h1, d1)}, X2 = {(h1, d2)},
X3 = {(h2, d1)} and X4 = {(h2, d2)}. Consider X1 = {(h1, d1)}. In this alloca-
tion the pair (h2, d2) would like to sign a contract, but the constraint prevents them
from doing so. However, the pair (h2, d1) would like to and could implement a de-
viation from form X1 = {(h1, d1)} to X3 = {(h2, d1)}. Continuing the analysis
reveals that X1 lead to X3, X3 to X4, and X4 to X1. X2 is not stable because h1
would reject d2 in favor of d1.
The previous example shows that there are matching problems with constraints
where all feasible allocations contain at least one blocking pair that could imple-
ment a deviation by themselves. However, X1 and X2 are very dierent. In X2, h1
is given the right to hold one contract and he is using it on his second most pre-
ferred doctor. This allocation would not be unconstrained stable conditional on
given rights. We exploit this characteristic to dene stability in our model. Both
X1 and X4 would be good candidates to be stable in this market, although a mech-
anism would be able to select only one of them as the nal allocation. If reports are
used to decide which one of them is chosen, then doctors will have an incentive to
manipulate their preferences. Hence we let the matchmaker decide.
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1.2.2 The Matchmaker
There are practical and theoretical reasons to introduce an authority to make de-
cisions that market participants cannot make by themselves (in an ecient and
strategy-proof way).
On a practical level, matchmakers exist in real matching with constraints mod-
els. School district authorities decide over budget and resource allocations among
schools, policy makers decide over constraints in medical matching and labor match-
ing, colleges decide over allocations of funds and physical resources among dierent
departments, etc. These authorities make important decisions in the nal allocation
of their respective matching markets and need to be included in the model.
On a theoretical level, constraints bind hospitals decisions, therefore a decision by
a hospital creates an externality over other hospitals by tightening constraints.
Even in a simple economy with externalities there is a need for a government to
restore eciency, usually achieved through taxes, quotas and property rights. The
rst two require the government to know the ecient level of activity in the market
while the third does not. We introduce a matchmaker and provide it with a way to
establish property rights over feasible allocations in order to achieve eciency.
We introduce the matchmaker m into the model of matching with constraints by
his preferences m over F∗. We assume m is complete, transitive and strict. We
assume the matchmaker always prefers more contracts signed than less contracts
i.e. |f ∗| ≥ |g∗| implies f ∗ m g∗.
1.2.3 Stability
As shown by previous examples, the set of (feasible) unconstrained stable and the
set of constrained stable allocations could be empty. However, as hinted in example
4, property rights can be used to dene stability. We dene stability in a matching
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market with constraints as follows:
Denition 1.3. The set of contracts X is stable if:
1. It is feasible: X ∈ F





3. It is unblocked: Let Y ⊂ X . If H(Y ) = h and Xh 6= Y = Ch(X ∪ Y ) =
CD(Y )(X ∪ Y ), then:
Xh = Ch(X ∪ Y,X∗h)
((X \Xh) ∪ Y )∗ /∈ F∗
The intuition behind the last two conditions is straightforward: hospitals should be-
have optimally conditional on the assigned property rights and no addition of prop-
erty rights should be possible. This denition is a generalization of unconstrained
stability and they are equivalent in a model with no constraints.
With this denition of stability in hand, the previous example displays a stable al-
location.
Example 1.5. As in the previous example, assume that the feasibility set is given
by:
F = {{(h1, d1)}, {(h1, d2)}, {(h2, d1)}, {(h2, d2)}}
and that preferences are as follows,
h1 : d1, d2 d1 : h2, h1
h2 : d2, d1 d2 : h1, h2
Now there are two stable sets of contracts, namely X1 = {(h1, d1)} and X4 =
{(h2, d2)}.
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1.3 Matching with Constraints Mechanism
Since the ultimate test of a model as the one presented here is its applicability in
real situations we would like to oer a mechanism with attractive properties regard-
ing four broad goals: eciency, transparency, simplicity and fairness.
As is standard in matching models, we achieve fairness by constructing an anony-
mous mechanism. In other words, our mechanism will consider only the stated
preferences of the participants and not their identity when determining an alloca-
tion. In addition, we focus on the stability of the nal allocation. Stable allocations
are fair in the following sense: no participant is able to provide a reason to be
matched with a more preferred partner, i.e. having a higher priority or being pre-
ferred by a dierent participant than the current match.
In this environment, with ordinal preferences, the most appealing concept of e-
ciency is Pareto optimality of the nal allocation. In order to make eciency and
fairness compatible we focus on Pareto optimal allocations among the set of stable
allocations.
We consider that transparency of the mechanism is also crucial, in particular par-
ticipants should be able to know the rules of the mechanism and the party imple-
menting the mechanism must be able to tell participants, without conict of inter-
est, that it is in their best interest to reveal their private information. Therefore, we
rely on strategy-proof implementation.
We achieve simplicity by nding a mechanism that simultaneously solves both al-
location problems, resources to hospitals and doctors to hospitals, simultaneously.
Since matching problems are combinatorial problems, solving the problems sequen-
tially would be a rather computationally daunting task. We show this is the case
for a special case of the seat production environment.
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1.3.1 Construction
We start the construction of our mechanism by making the following observation: if
hospitals decide the contracts they sign independently, the nal allocation might
not be feasible. Hence we need the matchmaker to allocate property rights to
eliminate the externality-like eect present in the matching with constraints. For-
mally, the externality-like eect is characterized as follows: consider a set of con-
tracts X and assume hospitals choose contracts independently without considering
that their decision aects and is aected by the decisions of other hospitals through
the binding constraints. Then, as shown in previous examples, it is possible that
∪
H
Ch(X) /∈ F∗. In order to guarantee the feasibility of the chosen set, hospitals need
to be aware of their feasible choices at a given decision moment. However, property
rights over feasible options do not exist, i.e. all participants are entitled in common
to resources. The matchmaker assigns property rights by oering appropriate feasi-
ble choice problems to hospitals.
Let X be a set of contracts and let F∗(X) be the set of property right sets at X,
dened as follows: F∗(X) = {f ∗ ∈ F∗ | f ⊂ X and f ∈ F}. Let Cm(X) =
maxmF(X). Through this process the matchmaker is able to assign property
rights over dierent conicting allocations of resources. After a particular allo-
cation of resources has been selected, hospitals choose contracts. Thus h1 selects
Ch1(X, Cm(CH(X))), h2 selects Ch2(X, Cm(CH(X))) and so on. This mechanism is
described in the following example.
Example 1.6. A school district has two schools h1 and h2 and three students d1,
d2 and d3. The district can nance either two seats in h1 and one in h2 or three
seats in h2 and oer students a stipend of s.
X = {(h1, d1), (h1, d2), (h1, d3), (h2, d1, s), (h2, d2, s), (h2, d3, s), (h2, d1), (h2, d2), (h2, d3)}
and the set of feasible sets would be:
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f1 = {(h2, d1, s), (h2, d2, s), (h2, d3, s)}
f2 = {(h1, d1), (h1, d2), (h2, d3)}
f3 = {(h1, d1), (h2, d2), (h1, d3)}
f4 = {(h2, d1), (h1, d2), (h1, d3)}
F = {f1, f2, f3, f4}
Consider the following preferences10 for schools. Preferences are responsive. h2
prefers students with stipend to students without stipend:
h1 : d1, d2, d3
h2 : d1, d2, d3
Hence
Ch1(X ) = {(h1, s1), (h1, s2), (h1, s3)}
Ch2(X ) = {(h2, s1, s), (h2, s2, s), (h2, s3, s)}
Not only are the previous school choices not mutually feasible, the choice by the
rst school is not feasible. The matchmaker can assign property rights in order to
guarantee the feasibility of the nal allocation. Consider rst preliminary construc-
tions:
F(CH(X )) = {{h1, h1}, {(h2, s), (h2, s), (h2, s)}}
The matchmaker prefers more contracts to less:
Cm(CH(X )) = {(h2, s), (h2, s), (h2, s)}
Thus,
Ch1(X , f ∗1 ) = ∅
Ch2(X , f ∗1 ) = f1
The matchmaker intervention produces the following aggregate behavior of the
market:
10Strictly speaking preferences are over contracts and not students, but for simplicity we iden-





In order to dene the Matching with Constraints Mechanism we introduce the Gen-
eralized Gale Shapley Algorithm 11, 12 as dened by Hateld and Milgrom (2005).
Dene the following order in X × X , (X, Y ) ≥ (X ′, Y ′) if and only if X ⊂ X ′ and
Y ′ ⊂ Y .
Denition 1.4. The Generalized Gale-Shapley Algorithm (GS) is dened as
the iterated application of F (XH , XD) = (X − RD(XD),X − RH(XH)). If the
iterated process nishes in a xed point (X,Y ) = F (X,Y ) starting from (X, Y )
we dene GS(X, Y ) = X ∩ Y . Analogously, GS(X, Y, f ∗) = X ∩ Y denotes the
xed point, if any, of iterated applications of F (XH , XD, f ∗) = (X − RD(XD),X −
RH(XH , f
∗))
With the aggregate behavior of the market dened as above we can dene our match-
ing with constraints mechanism as follows:
Denition 1.5. The Matching with Constraints Mechanism (MC) is dened
as the iterated applications of F̃ (XH , XD) = (X − RD(XD),X − R̃H(XH)). If the
iterated process nishes in a xed point (X,Y ) = F̃ (X,Y ) starting from (X, Y ) we
dene MC(X, Y ) = X ∩ Y .
1.3.2 Properties
In this section we introduce ve regularity conditions to guarantee the existence of
a stable set of contracts. The rst two are the appropriate generalizations of the
11GS has been central in the market design literature and its applications are wide. Applica-
tions to allocate medical students (Roth (1984a); Roth and Peranson (1999)), students to public
universities (Balinski and Sönmez (1999)), and medical graduate to residency programs in Japan
(Kamada and Kojima (2013)) are some examples.
12This algorithm was initially proposed by Gale and Shapley (2013). Subsequent developments
extended the GS algorithm to more general preferences by Roth (1984b) and more general envi-
ronments by Hateld and Milgrom (2005).
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substitutes condition and the law of aggregate demand as proposed by Hateld
and Milgrom (2005), which in a model without constraints are sucient to achieve
our goals. The third regularity condition is a generalization of the substitability
condition introduced by Kamada and Kojima (2013), which control the level at
which property rights are transferred to one hospital from another. We introduce
two new conditions to allow the model to handle complex constraints; the consis-
tency of choice property, to compare dierent allocations in dierent markets
and the contract replacement property, to correlate hospital preferences and
constraints.
The substitutes condition13 has been shown to guarantee the existence of a sta-
ble allocation in a model without constraints.14 In addition, every market without
constraints can be represented by a market with only one feasible set of contracts.
Hence, a matching market with constraints is a model where simultaneous uncon-
strained markets coexist. We assume that every unconstrained market satises the
substitutes condition. In our notation this assumption is equivalent to the following
condition we call the strong substitutes condition.
Denition 1.6. Ch satises the strong substitutes condition if and only if for
every X and Y and f ∗ ∈ F∗ such that X ⊂ Y , we have Rh(X, f ∗) ⊂ Rh(Y, f ∗).
Ch satises the substitutes condition if and only if for every X and Y such that
X ⊂ Y , we have Rh(X) ⊂ Rh(Y )
The law of aggregate demand was introduced by Hateld and Milgrom (2005) in
order to obtain strategy-proofness in a model without constraints. Analogously to
the substitutes condition, we assume that the law of aggregate demand is satised
in every market. In our model, this is achieved by a condition we call the strong
13The substitutes condition was introduced to the matching literature by Kelso and Crawford
(1982). Weaker conditions are known, see Hateld and Kojima (2010).
14for example, see Hateld and Milgrom (2005)
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law of aggregate demand.
Denition 1.7. Ch satises the strong law of aggregate demand if and only if
for every X and Y and f ∗ ∈ F∗ such that X ⊂ Y , we have |C(X, f ∗)| ≤ |C(Y, f ∗)|.
Ch satises the law of aggregate demand if and only if for every X and Y such
that X ⊂ Y , we have |C(X)| ≤ |C(Y )|.
The strong substitutes condition and the strong law of aggregate demand charac-
terize hospital preferences in this model. Kamada and Kojima (2013) identied a
condition, they call substitability, analogous to the substitutes condition to charac-
terize the matchmaker's preferences. We generalize the substitability condition to
assign property rights in out model. When Cm satises the substitutes condition,
the matchmaker never increases the property rights of any hospital after having re-
stricted that hospital. The set of property rights of a given hospital can increase or
decrease, but cannot increase after decreasing.
Denition 1.8. Cm satises the substitutes condition if and only if for every X∗
and Y ∗ such that X∗ ⊂ Y ∗, we have Cm(Y ∗) ∩X∗ ⊂ Cm(X∗).
In this model, in which many markets are studied as a single market with con-
straints, it is necessary to introduce some regularity in hospital preferences across
dierent market. To see this, suppose X is an unconstrained stable allocation in
market f ; hence there is no blocking set Y in market f ∗, however, there might be
blocking sets in other markets, say g∗. We introduce the consistency of choice
property in order to compare stable allocations in dierent markets.
Denition 1.9. Ch satises consistency of choice if and only if for every X and
g∗,f ∗ ∈ F∗ such that g∗ ⊂ f ∗, we have Ch(X, g∗) ⊂ Ch(X, f ∗).
One of the main characteristics of matching models, for example the original model
of Gale and Shapley (2013), has been the so called tentative acceptance i.e. the
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ability of a hospital to hold a doctor until a better one arrives and then substitute
one for the other. In a model without constraints or in a model in which all con-
tracts are of the same type (for example distributional constraints) any hospital
can substitute contracts freely. However, in a model with complex constraints and
contracts this is not the case. Suppose for example that a hospital would like to
substitute a contract w with a contract x, if they induce the same property rights,
then the hospital can do so immediately. However, if they induce dierent prop-
erty rights then the substitution might not be possible. We introduce a contract
replacement property to control these cases.
Denition 1.10. F satises the contract replacement property if and only if
for every X and x,w /∈ X such that CH(Xw) = Xw and CH(Xwx) = Xx, we have
x∗ = w∗
When the contract replacement property is satised, hospitals are only willing to
substitute contracts with the same property rights. Substitution of contracts with
dierent property rights is also possible, but must be induced by constraints and
not the unconstrained preferences.
With the ve regularity conditions in place we proceed to show the properties of
this model. We rst show that C̃H satises the substitutes condition, which guar-
antees the existence of an unconstrained stable allocation in the model with only
one hospital whose preferences are represented by C̃H . The next step is to show
that unconstrained stable allocations in the aggregate model are stable allocations
in the model with many hospitals and constraints. We show next that the Match-
ing with Constraints Mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors by showing that C̃H
also satises the law of aggregate demand. Finally we show that the Matching with
Constraints Mechanism is ecient.
Theorem 1.1. Suppose F satises the contract replacement property, Cm satises
the substitutes condition and Ch satises the strong law of aggregate demand, the
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strong substitutes condition and the consistency of choice condition for all h ∈ H,
then C̃H satises the substitutes condition.
Proof. We rst show that CH(Y z)∗ ⊂ CH(Y zx)∗ in order to use the substitutes
property of Cm. Since CH satises the substitutes condition and the law of aggre-
gate demand, there are three cases to consider. i) If x is not chosen, CH(Y z)∗ =
CH(Y zx)
∗; ii) if x is simply chosen, i.e CH(Y zx) = CH(Y z)x, then CH(Y z)∗ ⊂
CH(Y zx)
∗; iii) if x is chosen in favor of w, i.e. CH(Y zx) = (CH(Y z) \ w)x, then
CH(Y z)
∗ ⊂ CH(Y zx)∗ since the contract replacement property implies that x∗ = y∗.
In order to prove that C̃H satises the substitutes condition we show that z ∈
C̃H(Y zx) implies z ∈ C̃H(Y z) for arbitrary Y, x, z. z ∈ C̃H(Y zx) implies that
z ∈ CH(Y zx, f ∗) for f ∗ = Cm(CH(Y zx)). By the strong substitutes condition
we have z ∈ CH(Y z, f ∗) and by the denition of choice function we have z ∈
CH(Y z, f
∗ ∩ (Y z)∗). Let g∗ = Cm(CH(Y z)), then f ∗ ∩ (Y z)∗ ⊂ g∗ by the sub-
stitutes condition of Cm. Finally, by the consistency of choice property we have
z ∈ CH(Y z, g∗) = C̃H(Y z)
If C̃H satises the substitutes condition, then F (XH , XD) = (X − RD(XD),X −
R̃H(XH)) is a monotone function with non-empty set of xed points. The set of
xed points is a lattice. In the following theorem we show that these xed points
are stable allocations.
Theorem 1.2. Suppose F satises the contract replacement property, Cm satises
the substitutes condition and Ch satises the strong law of aggregate demand, the
strong substitutes condition and the consistency of choice condition for all h ∈ H, ,
then the set of stable allocations is not empty.
Proof. Since C̃H satises the substitutes condition, then F (XH , XD) = (X −
RD(XD),X − R̃H(XH)) has a non-empty set of xed points, which forms a com-
plete lattice. Every xed point is an unconstrained stable set of contracts. Sup-
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pose X is an unconstrained stable set of contracts. We show that X is stable. By
construction, X is feasible and individually rational. Let Y be a set of contracts
such that D(Y ) = h, and Xh 6= Y = Ch(XUY ) = CD(Y )(XUY ). Suppose that
Xd 6= Z = Ch(XUY,X∗h), then there is Z ′ such that X 6= Z ′ = C̃H(XUZ ′), which is
a contradiction. Suppose now that ((X \Xh) ∪ Y )∗ ∈ F∗, then Ch(XUY ) is feasible
so C̃H(XUY ) = ((X \Xh) ∪ Y ) 6= X, a contradiction. Hence X is stable.
The next couple theorems show that the law of aggregate demand is also satised;
hence the Matching with Constraints Mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors.
Theorem 1.3. Suppose F satises the contract replacement property, Cm satises
the substitutes condition and Ch satises the strong law of aggregate demand, the
strong substitutes condition and the consistency of choice condition for all h ∈ H, ,
then C̃H satises the law of aggregate demand.
Proof. It is sucient to show that for any Y and x we have
∣∣∣C̃H(Y )∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣C̃H(Y x)∣∣∣.
Since CH satises the law of aggregate demand and the substitutes condition, we
have 3 cases to consider. i) If x is not chosen, then C̃H(Y ) = C̃H(Y x); ii) If x is
simply chosen, let f ∗ = Cm(CH(Y )) and g∗ = Cm(CH(Y x)). Since x was simply
chosen we have that CH(Y )∗ ⊂ CH(Y x)∗, thus by the substitutes property of Cm
we have that
∣∣∣C̃H(Y )∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣C̃H(Y x)∣∣∣; iii) If x is chosen in place of w, then by the
contract replacement property we have that
∣∣∣C̃H(Y )∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣C̃H(Y x)∣∣∣.
Theorem 1.4. Suppose F satises the contract replacement property, Cm satises
the substitutes condition and Ch satises the strong law of aggregate demand, the
strong substitutes condition and the consistency of choice condition for all h ∈ H,
then the Matching with Constraints mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors.
Proof. Since C̃H satises the law of aggregate demand and the substitutes condi-
tion, the Matching with Constraints mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors by a
result in Hateld and Milgrom (2005).
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In a matching market with constraints stability is not ecient either. Consider a
market with two hospitals, one only looking for doctors specialized in oncology and
the other in neurology. Suppose resources consist on the appropriate equipment
for each practice but are assigned incorrectly. The equipment for oncology to the
neurology hospital and vice versa. Then the allocation where both hospital hire no
doctor is stable, but not ecient. In order to move to an ecient allocation of re-
sources a joint redistribution of rights would be needed. Since stability does not
involve multiple hospitals, stability does not imply eciency.
Theorem 1.5. Suppose F satises the contract replacement property, Cm satises
the substitutes condition and Ch satises the strong law of aggregate demand, the
strong substitutes condition and the consistency of choice condition for all h ∈ H, ,
then the Matching with Constraints mechanism is ecient.
Proof. Let X be the set of contracts assigned by the Matching with Constraints
mechanism. Suppose there is a feasible set of contracts Y such that Yh = Ch(XY ) =
CD(Yd)(XY ) for all hospitals and Yd = Cd(XY ) for all doctors. Hence, there is Y
such that X 6= Y = C̃H(XY ) = CD(Y )(XUY ). Hence X is not chosen by the
Matching with Constraints Mechanism.
1.3.3 Structure
In this section we show the structure produced by this model. Consider, for exam-
ple, a market with constraints representing ve individual markets f ∗1 , ..., f
∗
5 . It is
well-known that, in a market without constraints, the set of stable allocations forms
a lattice. In the following gure the lattice for market f ∗4 is represented by a rect-
angle, with maximum stable allocation GS(∅,X , f ∗4 ) and minimum stable allocation
GS(X , ∅, f ∗4 ).
The following theorem establishes that, in general, some of these lattices can be
ordered by their maximum and minimum elements.
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GS(∅,X , f4)
GS(X , ∅, f4)
Figure 1.3: The set of stable allocations of market f4
Theorem 1.6. Let C1H and C
2
H be two choice functions satisfying the substitutes
condition such that C1H(X) ⊂ C2H(X) for all X, then GS1(∅,X ) ≤ GS2(∅,X ) and
GS1(X , ∅) ≤ GS2(X , ∅). Furthermore, GS1(∅,X ) = GS1(GS2(∅,X )1, GS2(∅,X )2).
Proof. (Unconstrained) stable allocations are the xed points of the following func-
tions: F1(XH , XD) = (X−RD(XD),X−R1H(XH)) in the rst market and F2(XH , XD) =
(X−RD(XD),X−R2H(XH)) in the second market. Hence F1(XH , XD) ≤ F2(XH , XD).
Let X1 be the highest xed point of F1 and X2 be the highest xed point of F2.
Since X1 = F1(X1) ≤ F2(X1), hence X1 ≤ X2 = ∨{x | x ≤ F2(x)} . For the sec-
ond part consider the following inequality and apply F1 as many times as necessary
GS1(∅,X ) ≤ GS2(∅,X ) ≤ (∅,X ).
The next gure depicts the lattices of markets f ∗1 , . . . , f
∗
5 with the ordering provided
by the previous theorem. Every gray rectangle represents the set of stable alloca-
tions in each market. The solid black rectangle represents the set of stable alloca-
tions of the market formed by the union of the smaller markets. The red dots are
the Pareto frontier for doctors.
In some applications it might be desirable that the nal selected allocation is a
Pareto ecient allocation from the point of view of the doctors. The Matching with
Constraints mechanism does exactly that.
Theorem 1.7. The Matching with Constraints Mechanism is Pareto optimal
for doctors among the set of stable sets of contracts.








Figure 1.4: The set of stable allocations of markets f1, ..., f5
Mechanism. Suppose Y is a stable set of contracts that Pareto dominates X for
doctors. Then Y is (unconstrained) stable in the market with only one hospital rep-
resented by C̃H . Thus contradicting the fact that X is Pareto optimal for doctors
in the market with only one hospital.
1.4 Conclusion
We developed a matching model in which several matching markets can be ana-
lyzed simultaneously as a single matching market with constraints. We oered a
mechanism capable of nding a stable (within and across markets) and ecient al-
location. Our mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors and nds the appropriate
market and the stable allocation in that market simultaneously. The model is capa-
ble of implementing several design previously studied independently, including mod-
els of armative action (Abdulkadirouglu and Sönmez (2003)) and distributional
constraints (Kamada and Kojima (2013)).
As shown in the main text, the required properties for the matching mechanism
with constraints impose a limit on the complexity of constraints and the structure
of preferences. However, it is possible to extend the complexity of constraints by
giving up structure in some other parts of the model. One such move could be to
move from substitutable preferences to additive preferences, in that case one could
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dispense of the contract replacement property since no hospital would naturally
replace a doctor for another, and if they do is because a constraint.
In this paper we have focused on a simultaneous solution to the allocation prob-
lems (market and allocation) since computational simplicity is often of practical
concern. Moving to a sequential solution could open the door to even more complex
constraints at the expense of computational power. The simplest example would be
to calculate all stable allocations in all markets and then choose one in the Pareto
frontier. However, it is not clear if such a procedure could have nice incentive prop-
erties in general.
A second extension to the complexity of constraints would be achievable by spe-
cializing our preferences. In particular, in the individual rationality dimension, if
some structure is provided to the individual rational allocations for hospitals the
model could potentially discard the assumption of free disposal of contracts. One
such specialization is the minimum quotas in schools or hospitals.
The tradeos of complexity in matching models are still being studied and this pa-
per hopefully has made some of them easier to understand.
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Chapter 2: Strategy-proofness for Hospitals in Matching Markets
Abstract. Strategy-proof implementation is one of the many elements that have
contributed to the successful application of matching theory in real life. However,
in many-to-one matching markets without transfers (e.g., doctors to hospitals with
xed salaries) there is no stable mechanism which is strategy-proof for hospitals.
Furthermore, strategy-proofness and stability cannot be achieved for both hospitals
and doctors simultaneously even in one-to-one matching markets. This paper shows
that in many-to-one matching markets with transfers it is possible to guarantee sta-
bility and strategy-proofness-for-hospitals whenever an opportunity cost condition is
satised. In addition, it is shown that stability and strategy-proofness are possible
for both hospitals and doctors simultaneously . Finally, it is shown that strategy-
proofness can be achieved in the interior of the core.
Many matching markets have successfully adopted centralized mechanisms as an al-
ternative to the price system.1 In these centralized markets, the nal allocation is
computed using information provided by market participants. Typically, the nal
allocation is chosen to be stable with respect to the provided information. However,
it is desirable that stability holds with respect to the actual information. Hence,
1See Abdulkadiro§lu et al. (2005); Abdulkadirouglu et al. (2005); Abdulkadirouglu and Sönmez
(2003) for School Choice, Roth et al. (2004) for Kidney Exchange, Sönmez (2013); Sönmez and
Switzer (2013) for Branch of Choice and Roth and Peranson (1999); Crawford and Knoer (1981);
Kelso and Crawford (1982); Roth and Xing (1994) for Residents Markets.
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participants' incentives to report truthfully are extremely important. In practice,
it is often a goal to make participants best strategy to report their actual informa-
tion, regardless of other agents' reports. Whenever this is achieved it is said that
the mechanism is strategy-proof.
Strategy-proof mechanisms possess several advantages over other mechanisms. First,
it is possible to guarantee that eciency or other properties hold with respect to
actual and not only with respect to reported information. This is particularly im-
portant for many institutions since it has been shown experimentally that in some
non-strategy-proof mechanisms, up to 80% of agents misrepresent their preferences.2
Furthermore, submitted preferences are often used in welfare assessments, for exam-
ple by computing the number of participants obtaining their rst choice, second
choice and so on.3 Second, no resources are wasted by market participants in or-
der to compute better-than-truthful reports. In an auction, which is a special kind
of matching market, bidders spend a lot of time and money devising their strate-
gies and they often hire auction consultants.4 In school choice, parents spend time
and money to obtain better outcomes from non-strategy-proof mechanisms.5 Third,
participants with more information about the market cannot take advantage of less
informed participants. This is particularly important in school choice, where equal
access to education is often a goal.6
In a series of papers, Roth studied several incentive properties of stable mecha-
nisms in two-sided markets without transfers. In these markets there are two kinds
of agents: hospitals and doctors. Hospitals want to be matched with a set of doc-
2See (Chen and Sönmez, 2006) for an example
3See Featherstone (2011) for a discussion about rankings as a welfare criterion.
4Some problems faced by bidders in high-stake auctions are described in Cramton and
Schwartz (2000); Milgrom et al. (2009)
5See Pathak and Sönmez (2008, 2013) for the study of several non-strategy-proof mechanisms.
6See also Pathak and Sönmez (2008, 2013) for a revealing discussion about the issue.
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tors and doctors want to be matched with at most one hospital. The market is said
to be one-to-one whenever hospitals want to be matched with at most one doctor
and many-to-one otherwise. Roth showed that (i) in one-to-one matching mar-
kets, it is possible to obtain strategy-proofness for doctors or hospitals(Roth, 1982),
but not both simultaneously (Roth, 1984b) and (ii) in many-to-one matching mar-
kets, strategy-proofness can be guaranteed for doctors, but not for hospitals (Roth,
1985).
This paper studies many-to-one markets with transfers and shows that stability and
strategy-proofness for both hospitals and all agents (doctors and hospitals simul-
taneously) are possible by characterizing the conditions under which the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is stable.7 The VCG mechanism is always strategy-
proof.
This paper uses a version of the assignment game proposed by Shapley and Shubik
(1971) as generalized by Kelso and Crawford (1982). In this model, doctors want
to be matched to at most one hospital and hospitals can be matched to multiple
doctors. In this model, transfers can be made continuously, in discrete quantities,
or not at all.
The rst contribution of this paper is to show that a VCG mechanism, dierent
from the pivot mechanism, is stable whenever agents' preferences satisfy an oppor-
tunity cost condition. This condition is satised whenever every doctor can nd a
hospital that oers him at least his opportunity cost. In this mechanism, hospital i
receives a payo πVi = V (A) − V (A \ i), where V is the coalitional value function
and A is the set of agents in the market. Leonard (1983) proved the result in one-
to-one matching markets and his technique rests completely on the unit demand
assumption. Gul and Stacchetti (1999) proved the result for replica economies.
The second contribution is to identify markets where strategy-proofness, together
7See Vickrey (1961)
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with stability, can be achieved for all agents. The above mechanism cannot be used
directly for all agents since, in general,
∑
i∈A
πVi > V (A). However, careful inspection
reveals that if agent i is receiving a payo of πVi he is fully capturing two marginal
values. When a new agent enters a matching market, say a doctor, two eects take
place. First, a new agent who demands hospitals enters the market; and second,
a new object is available for hospitals currently in the market. In order to obtain
strategy-proofness we only need agents to be able to capture the marginal value of
their information i.e. the marginal value they produce as demanders not as objects.
For agent i, this marginal value is captured by πUi = U(S)−U(S \ i), where U(T ) is
the maximum value that can be achieved with all agents present only using the in-
formation of agents in T . Thus πUi is the marginal contribution of agent i's private
information and πUi − πVi is the marginal contribution of agent i's existence as an
object. If no agent's information is pivotal (the agent himself is pivotal), then the
U mechanism is strategy-proof for all agents and stable whenever the private values
of an ecient matching belong to the set of stable payos.
The third contribution is to show that strategy-proofness either for hospitals or
doctors can be achieved without oering an extremal matching. In general, strategy-
proofness is achieved by oering agents their most preferred stable allocation.8 In
continuous transfers models, this payo is characterized by πVi = V (A) − V (A \ i).
However, as discussed above, strategy-proofness can also be obtained by oering
agents the marginal contribution of their information, πUi = U(A) − U(A \ i). We
show that the stability of these payos is directly linked to the proportion of sur-
plus generated at each side of the market. In particular, for any vector of stable
payos {πi}A, there is a division of total surplus that makes the U mechanism sta-
ble and strategy-proof, i.e. πi = U(A)− U(A \ i) for all agents.
8See for example, Crawford and Knoer (1981); Kelso and Crawford (1982); Roth and So-
tomayor (1992)
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Finally, it is shown that strategy-proofness for hospitals can be implemented in dis-
crete transfers. The level to which transfers can be used in a matching markets
varies signicantly. However, this paper shows that allowing transfers to be nego-
tiated in the matching process not only would improve eciency (with respect to
the reports), but also makes agents more willing to report their true private infor-
mation. This increases the eciency (with respect to the actual preferences) and
accountability of the market.
Incentives in matching markets have been studied systematically since Roth's con-
tributions (1982; 1984b; 1985). A rst line of research has been devoted to nding
restrictions on preference proles for mechanisms to achieve strategy-proofness. De-
mange and Gale (1985) showed that Roth's conclusions hold in very general one-
to-one environments where agents have preferences over each other and all have
possibly dierent valuations over money. Alcalde and Barberà (1994) showed that
the Gale-Shapley algorithm is the mechanism that achieves stability and strategy-
proofness in the biggest set of preference proles where both are possible. Sönmez
(1997; 1999) introduced two kinds of manipulations observed in real matching mar-
kets: capacities misrepresentations and pre-arranged matches. He showed that there
is no mechanism capable of avoiding such manipulations in general. Later on, Ko-
jima (2007) and Kesten (2012) showed that some preference domains avoid those
manipulations. This paper continues this line of research and shows that hospital
strategy-proofness is possible when an opportunity cost condition holds.
A second line of research has studied incentives in large markets. In particular,
Roth and Peranson (1999), Immorlica and Mahdian (2005) and Kojima and Pathak
(2009) show that strategy-proofness for almost all agents is possible as the number
of agents increase, but the diversity of preferences decreases. Roth and Peranson
(1999) showed that this property holds in some physician markets. In small mar-
kets, however, manipulability is still possible with current mechanisms. This paper
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continues the large market spirit by showing that as the number of possible trans-
fers increases, strategy-proofness for all hospitals becomes possible. This fact could
have great practical implications since the discreteness of transfers traded in the
markets is a market design variable.
This paper is also related to the literature on VCG auctions. It is well known that
the VCG payments are lower than the lowest anonymous linear Walrasian equi-
librium payments. However, several deviations from anonymous linear prices can
achieve VCG payments. Ausubel (2006) uses personalized linear prices. Bikhchan-
dani and Ostroy (2002); de Vries et al. (2007); Mishra and Parkes (2007) use per-
sonalized non-linear prices. The opportunity cost condition implies that VCG pay-
os can be implemented with anonymous linear prices.
2.1 Matching Markets
Throughout the paper, capital letters will represent both sets and their cardinal-
ity. Similarly, throughout the paper, when an assumption is stated, it is considered
as true in all subsequent parts of the paper, including theorems. We denote the
union of two sets Y and X by Y X. The matching market is formed by two kinds
of agents, doctors and hospitals. The set of doctors is denoted by D and the set of
hospitals by H with typical elements d and h, respectively. We denote the set of all
agents by A = HD. We assume there is a nite number of agents in the market. It
will be assumed that hospitals can be matched to several doctors, but doctors can
be matched to at most one hospital.
Each doctor d has preferences ud : H{∅} → R. Each hospital h has a capacity ch
and preferences uh : Ch → R, where Ch is the set of subsets of D with cardinality at
most ch. We assume that there is a common utility metric, that aects agents pay-
os linearly, i.e. if agent a is matched to set T and receives a transfer of ta, then his
payo is πa = ua(T ) + ta. The level at which transfers can be made in a particular
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market varies considerably across applications. In school choice, societies have de-
cided that wealth should not determine who gets the better schools; hence modeled
as a no-transfers market. In cadet branching, cadets have the opportunity to serve
longer times in order to obtain a branch they like more; hence some discrete trans-
fers are used. Labor markets with exible transfers would be modeled as continuous
transfers matching markets. In order to simplify the distinction between models
with dierent degrees of transfers we introduce the denition of a q-market.
Denition 2.1. A q-market is a market where all transfers made are multiples of
1
q
∈ R+. The 0-market represents the no-transfers case and the ∞-market repre-
sents the continuous case.
A q-matching Mt in a q-market is a disjoint collection of sets of doctors M = {Di}i∈H+1
such that |Dh| ≤ ch and a vector of transfers (multiples of 1q ) t ∈ R
D such that
td = 0 for every d ∈ DH+1. A hospital h is matched to the set of doctors Dh and re-




. DH+1 are unassigned doctors. The set of matchings in a
market with A agents is denoted by M(A) and the set of matchings where all trans-
fers are zero is denoted by M0(A). Given a particular matching Mt, the associated
payo of agent a is denoted by πMta and the associated private value is u
Mt
a .
Given a particular matching, every coalition of hospitals and doctors can arrange
oers to improve their payos from any initial situation; they can try to improve
their monetary component with their current partners, they can try to form new
partnerships, or reject current ones. If such improving coalitions cannot be formed,
then the matching is called stable. Hence stability is the basic notion of equilibrium
in matching markets. In addition to its theoretical appeal, stability has been proved
fundamental for the correct performance of real matching markets since unstable
allocations typically lead to an unraveling of the market.
Denition 2.2. The q-matching Mt is stable in q-market if and only if
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 πMta ≥ ua(∅) for all a ∈ A
 There is no q-matching (Mt)∗ and h ∈ H such that π(Mt)
∗
a ≥ πMta for all
a ∈ hD∗h with at least one strict inequality.
Notice that the second condition applies only to members of the blocking coali-
tion hD∗h and hence to nd a blocking matching (Mt)
∗ it would be sucient to
assign members of hD∗h together and leave everyone else unmatched.
It is well-known that if hospitals' preferences satisfy the substitutes condition, then
the set of stable matchings is not empty.9 In discrete markets, if agents' preferences
between matchings are strict, then there is a hospital-optimal matching MtH and a
doctor-optimal matching MtD.10 The associated payos for agent a are denoted by
πMtHa and π
MtD
a , respectively. In the continuous case, a hospital-optimal matching
MtH and a doctor-optimal matching MtD always exit and the associated payos
for agent a are also denoted by πMtHa and π
MtD
a . In the continuous case, the optimal
matchings might fail to be unique, but their associated payos will be. We assume
hospitals' preferences satisfy the substitutes condition. We rst dene the demand
correspondence and value function for hospitals.











ti is its value function.
Denition 2.4. uh satises the substitutes condition if and only if for every
t, t∗ ∈ RD such that t ≤ t∗, for every T ∈ Th(t), there is T ∗ ∈ Th(t∗) such that
T ∩ S ⊂ T ∗; where S is the set of doctors with ts = t∗s .
In addition to the substitutes condition we assume that every hospital needs to hire
at least one doctor to produce any surplus and every doctor - hospital pair produce
more surplus together than the unmached doctor.
9See Kelso and Crawford (1982)
10See Hateld and Milgrom (2005)
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Denition 2.5. uh satises the marginal product condition if and only if uh(∅) =
0 and for all d ∈ D and Dh ⊂ D such that d /∈ Dh and dDh ∈ Ch we have
uh(dDh) + ud(h)− uh(Dh) ≥ ud(∅).
The above condition allows for cases with uh(dDh) < uh(Dh) with d /∈ Dh i.e. a
hospital would need to be compensated to hire a doctor. In the context of resident
matching, this assumption could feel unnatural, however, in other applications such
a school choice, it is the norm. Schools and colleges usually charge students to get
admitted. Unless otherwise noted, it is assumed that the substitutes and marginal
product conditions are satised by all uh throughout the paper.
2.2 Strategy-Proofness for Hospitals in the continuous market
We begin this section by providing some standard preliminary denitions. A mech-
anism φ is a function that maps preference proles to q-matchings in a q-market.
The matching at preference prole {ui}i∈A is denoted by φ({ui}i∈A) ∈ M(A). A
mechanism φ is said to be strategy-proof for agent a if there exist no preference





a . A mechanism φ is said to be strategy-proof for B (set) if it is strategy-
proof for all b ∈ B. That is, no agent in B has an incentive to misreport his prefer-
ences under the mechanism. The next proposition, due to Roth (1985), establishes
that there is no strategy-proof for Hospitals mechanism in the 0-market. Through-
out the paper, propositions will be used to state important known results.
Proposition 2.1. Roth 85. There is no stable and strategy-proof mechanism for
Hospitals in the 0-market.
Example 2.1. Consider a market with three hospitals and four doctors. Hospitals
and Doctors have cardinal valuations over each other. The left matrix contains the
values each hospital assigns to every doctor and the number of doctors they are
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willing to hire. The right matrix contains the values for doctors. It is assumed that
both groups assign a value of zero to being unassigned.
Preferences
Hospitals
d1 d2 d3 d4 q
h1 4 3 2 1 2
h2 4 3 2 1 1
h3 3 2 4 1 1
Doctors
d1 d2 d3 d4
h1 2 2 3 3
h2 1 3 1 2
h3 2 1 2 1
Suppose transfers are prohibited and a stable allocation is to be implemented. In
this case, the ordinal representation is sucient to characterize the set of stable
matchings. Under the true preference prole, there is only one stable matching,
shown on the left. On the right there is an improving deviation for h1.
True Preferences Deviation
h1 : d1 d2 d3 d4
h2 : d1 d2 d3 d4
h3 : d3 d1 d2 d4
d1 : h3 h1 h2
d2 : h2 h1 h3
d3 : h1 h3 h2
d4 : h1 h2 h3
h1 : d1 d4
h2 : d1 d2 d3 d4
h3 : d3 d1 d2 d4
d1 : h3 h1 h2
d2 : h2 h1 h3
d3 : h1 h3 h2




d1 πd1 = 3
d2 πd2 = 2
d3 πd3 = 3




d1 πd1 = 2
d2 πd2 = 3
d3 πd3 = 2
d4 πd4 = 3
Roth's proposition applies to 0-markets. In ∞-markets, however, there is an e-
cient and strategy-proof mechanism: VCG. The VCG mechanism is dened below.
First we dene the coalitional value function.




πMta is the coalitional value function.
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With the coalitional value function at hand, we dene the VCG mechanism for a
set of agents B.
Denition 2.7. The VCG for agents in B works as follows. It is assumed that
the mechanism knows ua for every a ∈ A \ B. Agent b ∈ B sends ub to the mecha-




πMta is implemented. Agent b is charged a





a +W (A\b). Where W is a coalitional value function with
the reported and known preferences. Let P =
∑
b∈B
pb be the total collected payments,
let {ta}a∈A\B be a set of real numbers such that P =
∑
a∈A\B
ta. Then the payo for
agent a ∈ A\B is given by π(Mt)
∗
a +ta. Whenever there is a set of transfers {ta}a∈A\B
such that the nal payos are stable, those transfers are implemented.
Lemma 2.1. The VCG mechanism for agents in B is strategy-proof for agents in
B.
If agents in B play their dominant strategy, then every agent b ∈ B receives a pay-
o equal to πb = V (A)−V (A \ b) (agent b's VCG payo). We assume agents always
play their dominant strategy. Notice that VCG payos for members of B only de-
pend on the value of the coalitional value function and not on a particular ecient
allocation i.e. VCG payos and payments are well-dened even when there are mul-
tiple optimal allocations. Furthermore, notice that the only condition on payments
(and payos) for members of A \ B is budget balancedness. Whenever there is a set
of transfers transfers {ta}a∈A\B such that the nal payos are stable, we say that
the VCG for set B is stable. Example 2.2 shows that stability for hospitals is possi-
ble in some cases while Example 2.3 shows that it is not always possible.
Example 2.2. Suppose we have the market of example 2.1, but transfers can be
continuously adjusted. Then, VCG for hospitals is strategy-proof and stable.
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Hospitals
d1 d2 d3 d4 q
h1 4 3 2 1 2
h2 4 3 2 1 1
h3 3 2 4 1 1
Doctors
d1 d2 d3 d4
h1 2 2 3 3
h2 1 3 1 2
h3 2 1 2 1
Continuous transfers
h1πh1 = 22− 12 = 10
h2πh2 = 22− 17 = 5
h3πh3 = 22− 17 = 5
d1 πd1 = 0
d2 πd2 = 1
d3 πd3 = 1
d4 πd4 = 0
In the previous example, doctors payos are obtained after solving a system of
equations together with some inequalities. For instance, h2 is matched to d2, to-
gether they generate a surplus of 6 and h2's VCG payo is 5, then h2's payo must
be 1. The question is if, in general, the payments collected by the mechanism can
be distributed to doctors in a stable way.
In auction theory, Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) have shown that the substitutes
condition is sucient for the VCG payos to be stable, i.e. all collected payments
by the VCG mechanism can be paid to the auctioneer and the outcome is stable.
Unfortunately, in matching markets, the substitutes condition is not sucient to
obtain the same result. Consider the following example.
Example 2.3. There are two identical hospitals and three identical doctors. uh(A) =
0 if |A| = 0,uh(A) = 10 if |A| = 1, uh(A) = 18 if |A| = 2, uh(A) = 20 if
|A| = 3. ud(∅) = ud(h) = 0. In this market, both hospitals receive a payo of
πh = V (A)− V (A/h) = 28− 20 = 8 when the VCG mechanism is used. However, in
the unique stable allocation both hospitals receive a payo πh = 2 and all doctors
receive a payo πd = 8.
If we want VCG payos for Hospitals to agree with their maximum stable pay-
o, πMth = V (A) − V (A \ h) for every hospital, we need to be able to construct
a payo equivalent (for all agents dierent than h) allocation in the market with
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agents A/h. In particular, if doctor d is matched to hospital h in the market with
A agents, then we need to nd an allocation with A \ h agents that provides d
with πMtd . The natural candidate is one of his blocking coalitions, i.e. one of the
coalitions that would be formed if he were oered anything less than πMtd . Unfor-
tunately, it is possible that a hospital h′ belongs to a blocking coalition with some
doctor d and a dierent (incompatible) coalition with d′. This is illustrated in the
following example.
Example 2.4. Consider a market with two hospitals and three doctors. The ma-
trix contains the joint surpluses. It is assumed that both groups assign a value of
zero to being unassigned. t and s are a real numbers.
Hospitals
d1 d2 d3 q
h1 3 4 0 2
h2 2 3 1 1
Hospital-optimal
stable payos
πh1 = 4 πd1 = 1




πh1 = 5 πd1 = 2 + s+ t
πh2 = 1 πd2 = −t
πd3 = −s
If πd1 < 1 , then d1 and h2 form
a blocking coalition.
If πd2 < 2, then d2 and h2 form a
blocking coalition.
However, in the market without
h1, h2 cannot honor his blocking
oers with d1 and d2
simultaneously.
The previous example shows that the substitutes condition is not enough to guar-
antee the equivalence between the maximum stable payo and the VCG payo for
hospitals. There are, however, some regularities that the substitutes condition can
provide. Proposition 2.2 states well-known results that are used in our discussion
and proof of Theorem 2.1.
Proposition 2.2. In all matching markets,
 πMtDd = V (A)− V (A \ d) for every d ∈ D. Leonard (1983)
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 πMtHd = V (dA) − V (A) for every d ∈ D. Gul and Stacchetti (1999). Where
V (Ad) is the value of a market where an identical doctor d is added.
Proposition 2.2 characterizes doctors' payos at the hospital-optimal and doctor-
optimal matchings. Furthermore, it implies the strategy-proofness and stability
of VCG for doctors; as it shows that the VCG payo for doctors is equal to their
doctor-optimal stable payo. In this section we provide an analogous result for hos-
pitals. Example 2.4 shows that this cannot be achieved in general, however, we
show that if preferences satisfy a joint restriction we call the opportunity cost
condition, then the equivalence can be guaranteed.
Denition 2.8. V , the coalitional value, function satises the opportunity cost
condition if and only if for all d ∈ D and h ∈ H, V (A \ h)− V (A \ hd) ≥ V (Ad)−
V (A).
On the right hand side of the inequality we have V (Ad)−V (A), this is the opportu-
nity cost of doctor d in the optimal assignment. Intuitively, if a new copy of doctor
d were added to the market, the copy would go to the second highest value alloca-
tion, as the highest value is occupied by the original d. On the left hand side of the
inequality we have V (A \ h)− V (A \ hd), this is the marginal value of d in a market
where h is not present. When the opportunity cost holds, every doctor can nd a
hospital that oers him at least his opportunity cost.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose V satises the opportunity cost condition, then πMtHh =
V (A)− V (A \ h) for every h ∈ H in the continuous transfers market.
Corollary 2.1. Under theorem 2.1 assumptions the VCG for Hospitals is stable
and strategy-proof.
Theorem 2.1 is completely analogous to that of Leonard (1983). When preferences
satisfy the opportunity cost condition it is possible to use VCG for hospitals as a
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strategy-proof and stable mechanism. The opportunity cost condition is a joint con-
dition on preferences, however, there are some individual preferences that imply it.
For instance, linear preferences and unit demand preferences.
Denition 2.9. Hospital preferences are linear if and only if for all h ∈ H, ch =
|H| and for all Dh ⊂ D, uh(Dh) =
∑
d∈Dh
uh(d). Hospitals preferences are of unit
demand if for all h ∈ H, ch = 1.
Lemma 2.2. Unit demand and linear hospital preferences satisfy the opportunity
cost condition.
2.3 Strategy-Proofness for Hospitals And Doctors in the continuous mar-
ket
We begin this section with another impossibility result due to Roth (1982).
Proposition 2.3. Roth 82. There is no stable and strategy-proof mechanism for
hospitals and doctors in the 0-market, even when hospitals have unit demands.
Example 2.5. Consider a market with two hospitals and two doctors. Hospitals
and Doctors have cardinal valuations over each other. The left matrix contains the
values each hospital assigns to every doctor. All hospital are willing to hire at most
one doctor. The right matrix contains the values for doctors. It is assumed that










Suppose transfers are prohibited and a stable allocation is to be implemented. In
this case, the ordinal representation is sucient to characterize the set of stable
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matchings. Under the true preference prole, there are two stable matchings, shown
on right. Suppose the bottom matching is chosen by the mechanism.
h1 : d1 d2
h2 : d2 d1
d1 : h2 h1




d1 πd1 = 1.5




d1 πd1 = 4
d2 πd2 = 2
Then h1 can manipulate the outcome by manipulating his preferences.
h1 : d1
h2 : d2 d1
d1 : h2 h1




d1 πd1 = 1.5
d2 πd2 = 3.5
The mechanism provided by Theorem 2.1 cannot be used directly in this case to
obtain strategy-proofness for all agents. In general,
∑
a∈A
V (A) − V (A \ a) > V (A).
Hence, we need to reduce agents payos without losing strategy-proofness. Intu-
itively, agents needs to be able to capture the marginal value generated by their
reports. In auction environments, this is precisely achieved by oering every agent
a a payo equal to V (A)−V (A \ a). In matching environments, this is not the case.
When a new agent enters a matching market, say a doctor d, two eects take place:
(1) a new agent who demands hospitals enters the market and (2) a new object is
available for hospitals currently in the market. V (A) − V (A \ d) captures both
marginal eects. In order to obtain strategy-proofness we only need the rst one.
Doctor d's information's marginal value is captured by U(S)−U(S \d), where U(T )
is the maximum value that can be achieved with all agents present only using the
information of agents in T . The U function is dened below.
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πMta is the optimal matching function
It is possible to dene a second VCG mechanism using the U function.
Denition 2.11. The U-VCG mechanism for agents in B works as follows. It
is assumed that the mechanism knows ua for every a ∈ A \B. Agent b ∈ B sends ub




πMta is implemented. Agent





a + W ′(A \ b). Where W ′ is the optimal




the total collected payments, let {ta}a∈A\B be a set of real numbers such that P =∑
a∈A\B
ta. Then the payo for agent a ∈ A\B is given by π(Mt)
∗
a + ta. Whenever there
is a set of transfers {ta}a∈A\B such that the nal payos are stable, those transfers
are implemented.
Lemma 2.3. The U-VCG mechanism for agents in B is strategy-proof.
If agents in B play their dominant strategy, then every agent b ∈ B receives a pay-
o equal to πb = U(A) − U(A \ b). We assume agents always play their dominant
strategy. The dierence between the VCG and the U -VCG mechanisms is the last









If we apply the U -VCG to the previous example we achieve stability and strategy-
proofness for all agents in the market.











The payo for h1 is calculated as follows:





πMta = V (h1d1) + V (h2d2)
= 4 + 8 = 12




πMta = ud1(h1) + V (h2d2)
= 1.5 + 8 = 9.5
Analogously,
πUd1 = 12− 10.5 = 1.5; π
U
h2
= 12− 7.5 = 4.5;
πUd2 = 12− 8.5 = 3.5
It is routine to check that the payos in example 2.6 are stable. It is instructive
to compare the U -VCG payos with the hospital-optimal and doctor-optimal sta-
ble matchings. In particular, πMtHh1 = 4, π
MtH
h2




for the hospital-optimal stable matching and πMtDh1 = 0, π
MtD
h1
= 1, πMtHd1 = 4
and πMtHd2 = 7 for the doctor-optimal stable matching. The U -VCG mechanism is
achieving strategy-proofness and stability without oering either doctors or hos-
pitals their most preferred stable matching. In the following section we study this
property of the U -VCG mechanism. In the previous example, the U -VCG delivers
stable payos for all agents. In general, this is not the case. Consider the following
example.
Example 2.7. The U -VCG mechanism is not stable for this market, as it removes










πh1 = 12− 8 = 4
h2
πh2 = 12− 8 = 4
d1
πd1 = 12− 12 = 0
d2
πd2 = 12− 10 = 2
Both markets in example 2.6 and 2.7 share the same coalitional function, hence
they have the same set of stable payos. As it can be observed in the examples, the
division of surplus between agents plays a fundamental role in the stability of the
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U -VCG mechanism. The next denition formalizes the idea of a division of surplus.
Denition 2.12. Let {ua}A be a matching market with hospitals H, doctors D
and A = HD. Consider any other market with the same set of agents A, but dier-
ent preferences {u′a}A. We say that {ua}A is a division of {u′a}A if and only if for








u′d(h) and for all
d ∈ D ud(∅) = u′d(∅).
Notice that if {ua}A is a division of {u′a}A, then the opposite is also true i.e. divi-
sions form an equivalence relation in the set of preferences proles. Furthermore,
as lemma 2.4 establishes, divisions have no impact on the set of stable matchings,
which only depend on the coalitional value function.
Lemma 2.4. Let Π ⊂ RA be the set of payos arising from stable allocations in
market {ua}A. Let {u′a}A be a division of {ua}A and let Π′ ⊂ RA be its set of stable
payos. Then Π = Π′.
Whereas the VCG mechanism, and its stability for hospitals, only depends on the
coalitional value function, the stability of the U -VCG mechanism depends on the
particular division of surplus in the market. Consider examples 2.6 and 2.7. They
share the same coalitional value function and set of stable matchings and payos.
However, when the U -VCG mechanism is used to elicit preferences, the resulting
payos are stable only for the division in example 2.6. The following theorem shows
that the payos delivered by the U -VCG mechanism are stable for at least one rep-
resentative of each equivalence class in the space of preference proles.
Theorem 2.2. Let π ∈ Π, then there is a division such that πUa = πa, i.e. there is a
division of surplus such that the U-VCG mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for
all agents.
Theorem 2.2 does not say that the U -VCG mechanism delivers stable payos in
every market. However, for every market there is a division of surplus that would
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make the payos delivered by the U -VCG mechanism stable. In other words, for
every xed set of agents A and coalitional function V there is market characterized
by utility functions on {ua}A such that the U -VCG mechanism would deliver stable
payos in that market.
Theorem 3 describes the conditions under which utility functions {ua}A produce a
market for which the U -VCG mechanism is produces stable payos. We rst intro-
duce the concept of pivotal information. We say that agent i's information is not
pivotal if when his information is disregarded, but he is still considered part of the
matching market, the optimal allocation does not change.




πMta . Agents i's information is not piv-









πMta and let U
(Mt)∗
a be agent a's private
value in (Mt)∗. Suppose V satises the opportunity cost condition, no agent's in-
formation is pivotal with respect to (Mt)∗ and (U
(Mt)∗
a )A ∈ Π, then the U-VCG
mechanism is strategy-proof for all agents and stable.
If any agent's information is pivotal, then U -VCG will collect a positive payment
from this agent. If the U -VCG is used to elicit preferences from only one side of
the market, then there is the possibility (studied in the next section) of redistribut-
ing the payments to the other side to maintain all the surplus in the market. When
eliciting preferences from both sides of the market, this possibility disappears. Fur-
thermore, any agent whose information is not pivotal will have a payo equal to
his private surplus at the chosen allocation. Unfortunately, both conditions are
independent. The next example shows that there are non-pivotal markets where
(Ua)A /∈ Π and pivotal markets where (Ua)A ∈ Π.
Example 2.8. On the left, there is a non-pivotal market where (Ua)A /∈ Π. On the


















The U -VCG payments can be modied in a market where no agent's information is
pivotal but (Ua)A /∈ Π. Specically, let Mt be any stable matching and let td be the
minimum salary allowed for doctor d, i.e. regardless of the hiring hospital, d will
charge at least td. Of course, this will impact the true preferences in the market,
as now, doctor d will have preferences u′d(h) = ud(h) + td and hospital h will have
preferences u′h(Dh) = uh(Dh) −
∑
d∈Dh
td. With these new preferences, the market is
non-pivotal and (U ′a)A ∈ Π.
2.4 Non-extremal Strategy-Proofness.
In this section we study the one-sided U -VCG. As a rst motivation, we consider
example 2.6 from the previous section. It can be observed that the U -VCG mech-
anism achieves strategy-proofness for all agents and stability, but does not depend
on oering any side their most preferred stable allocation. Example 2.9 shows that
strategy-proofness and stability can be achieved in the interior of the set of stable
payos.












The U -VCG uses the following values:
U(A) = V (h1d1) + V (h2d2) = 4 + 8 = 12
U(A\h1) = ud1(h1)+V (h2d2) = 1.5+8 = 9.5
U(A\h2) = V (h1d1)+ud2(h2) = 4+3.5 = 7.5
U(A \ d1) = uh1(d1) + V (h2d2) = 2.5 + 8 =
10.5
U(A\d2) = V (h1d1)+uh2(d2) = 4+4.5 = 8.5
Hence,
πUh1 = 12− 9.5 = 2.5; π
U
h2
= 12− 7.5 = 4.5;
πUd1 = 12− 10.5 = 1.5; π
U
d2
= 12− 8.5 = 3.5















We know that the U -VCG mechanism is not stable in the market of example 2.7.
However, the following example shows that the U -VCG for doctors is stable and
strategy-proof for doctors.
Example 2.10. One-sided strategy-proofness can be obtained without oering that










The U -VCG uses the following values:
U(A) = V (h1d1) + V (h2d2) = 4 + 8 = 12
U(A\h1) = ud1(h1)+V (h2d2) = 0+8 = 8
U(A\h2) = V (h1d1)+ud2(h2) = 4+4 = 8
U(A\d1) = uh1(d1)+V (h2d2) = 4+8 = 12

















Hence the U -VCG for doctors delivers:
πh1 = V (h1d1)− 0 = 4;
πh2 = V (h2d2)− 2 = 6;
πd1 = 12− 12 = 0; πd2 = 12− 10 = 2
Hence the U -VCG for hospitals delivers:
πUh1 = 12− 8 = 4; π
U
h2
= 12− 8 = 4;
πd1 = V (h1d1)− 4 = 0;
πd2 = V (h2d2)− 4 = 4
As noted above, the performance of the U -VCG mechanism depends on the divi-
sion of surplus between both sides of the market. In this section, a special class of
division for which the U -VCG for hospitals is stable and strategy-proof are stud-
ied. It is assumed that preferences are linear. When preferences are linear, surplus
can be moved freely from one side to the other. In particular, divisions of the form
uh(Dh) = α(uh(Dh) +
∑
d∈Dh
ud(h)) for all α ∈ [0, 1] are well dened.
Denition 2.14. Let α ∈ [0, 1]. We say that the hospital and doctors preferences
forms an α division if uh(Dh) = α(uh(Dh) +
∑
d∈Dh
ud(h)) for all h and Dh ∈ D.
For a xed alpha, let πUh (α) the payo assigned to hospital h by the hospital U -
VCG mechanism. The following lemma describes a few properties of πUh .
Lemma 2.5. Let πUh (α) the payo assigned to hospital h by the hospital U-VCG
mechanism, then πUh is a monotone increasing piece-wise linear function satisfying:
 πUh (0) = 0 and π
U








πUh (0) = V (hDh) and
d
dα
πUh (0) = 0, where Dh is the set of doctors assigned
to h at the ecient matching.
The following theorem establishes several conditions for the one-sided U -VCG mech-
anism to deliver stable payos in markets characterized by α divisions.
Theorem 2.4. Suppose preferences are linear and Π has a non-empty interior. Let
hd be the hospital matched with d at a xed ecient matching.
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 If the lowest stable payo for every hospital is zero and V (hdd) > V (h
′d) for
all d and h′ 6= hd, then there is β ∈ (0, 1) such that for any α ∈ [0, β] πUh (α)
for all h ∈ H is stable.
 For every doctor there are at least two hospitals h, h′ such that V (hd) > 0 and
V (h′d) > 0, then there is β ∈ (0, 1) such that for any α ∈ [β, 1] πUh (α) for all
h ∈ H is stable.
Suppose that in a particular market all the surplus is generated by hospitals. In
this case, hospitals' preferences could be elicited using the VCG for hospitals mech-
anism and the hospital-optimal matching would be implemented in a strategy-proof
manner. In this case every hospital h would receive πUh (1) = V (A) − V (A \ h) as
a payo and doctors would receive their minimal stable payo. Now suppose that
in that market, a small quantity of surplus is shifted from hospitals; for example
by oering some wages to doctors. In this new market with wages, the set of stable
payos has not changed as V (hd) remains unchanged by the wage oered by h. In
this market, using VCG for hospitals would still be possible, however, according to
theorem 2.4 if the U -VCG for hospitals mechanism is used instead, then an interior
solution would be achieved i.e. hospitals would receive less than their maximum
stable payos and doctors would receive more than their minimum stable payos.
2.5 Hospital Strategy-proofness in the q-Market
Roth's theorems show that, in the 0-market, it is not possible to achieve strategy-
proofness for hospitals or all agents simultaneously. In sharp contrast, in the ∞-
market, strategy-proofness and stability for hospitals is possible. Which model de-
scribes better a particular real market depends on the institutional environment.
In school choice, transfers are completely prohibited whereas, in residents match-
ing, the monetary component of any transaction is a fundamental part. In markets
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where transactions are allowed, the level of discreteness of transfers is a market de-
sign variable. The following theorem shows that, if strategy-proofness for hospitals
is important in a particular market, there is always a discrete level of transactions
that achieves it, i.e. transfers only need to be as small as the smallest common fac-
tor between the set of possible valuations.
Theorem 2.5. Suppose preferences are integer valued and V satises the oppor-
tunity cost condition, then strategy-proofness and stability are possible in any q-
market for any q ∈ Z such that q ≥ 1.
When a stable allocation is to be implemented in a market where discrete quan-
tities of money can be exchanged the generalized Gale-Shapley mechanism is the
standard solution. For example, in the formed proposed by Kelso and Crawford
(1982). One important limitation of this mechanism is that it is not strategy-proof
for hospitals. Theorem 2.1 establishes that, when preferences satisfy the opportu-
nity cost condition, and monetary transfers can be continuously adjusted, the VCG
for hospitals is stable and strategy-proof. These two properties can be extended to
markets with discrete quantities of money by using a lowest common denominator
fraction i.e. the smallest tradable quantity of money is suciently small to oset
the smallest change in valuations. One very simple way of expressing this idea is
assuming that preferences are integer-valued. Thus in a market in which prefer-
ences are expressed in thousands of dollars, e.g. the value of a one year contract
between a hospital and a doctor is in thousands of dollars, a stable allocation can




In 2002, 16 law rms led a class action law suit, representing 3 former residents
seeking to represent all residents, arguing that the NRMP violated antitrust laws
and was a conspiracy to depress resident's wages. The complaint was:
Defendants and others have illegally contracted, combined and conspired
among themselves to displace competition in the recruitment, hiring,
employment and compensation of resident physicians, and to impose a
scheme of restraints which have the purpose and eect of xing, arti-
cially depressing, standardizing and stabilizing resident physician com-
pensation and other terms of employment.
Defendants' illegal combination and conspiracy has restrained competi-
tion in the employment of resident physicians by:
(a) stabilizing wages below competitive levels by exchanging competi-
tively sensitive information regarding resident physician compensation
and other terms of employment;
(b) eliminating competition in the recruitment and employment of resi-
dent physicians by assigning prospective resident physician employees to
positions through the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP);
and
(c) establishing and complying with anticompetitive accreditation stan-
dards and requirements through the Accreditation Council for Graduate
Medical Education (ACGME).
The suit was dismissed on August 12, 2004 in an Opinion, Order & Judgment by
Judge Paul L. Friedman based on evidence regarding the structure of wages in
other decentralized industries and expert opinions from several economists.
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To this date no wage negotiation takes place in the NRMP, however, this paper
shows that allowing transfers to be negotiated in the matching process not only
would enhance competition, it would also make agents more willing to report their
true private information. As argued in the introduction, this would increase the e-
ciency and accountability of the whole program.
2.7 Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs for the theorems stated in the paper. In order
to relate the results of this paper to the literature on VCG auctions we rst intro-
duce establish a connection between matching markets and auction markets. The
connection establishes that for any stable matching there is an equivalent Walrasian
equilibrium, dened as follows.
Denition 2.15. Let {ua}A be a matching market with hospitals H and doctors
D. Suppose that for all d ∈ D we have ud(h) = 0 for all h ∈ H. A vector t ∈




Dh = D and for all h 6= h′ Dh
⋂
Dh′ = ∅. ({Dh}H , t) is a Walrasian
Equilibrium (WE).
We rst consider a couple of lemmas.
Lemma. 2.4 Let Π ⊂ RA be the set of payos arising from stable allocations in
market {ua}A. Let {u′a}A be a division of {ua}A and let Π′ ⊂ RA be its set of stable
payos. Then, Π = Π′.
Proof. By denition, π ∈ Π if and only if
∑
C




V (A). By denition of a division, V (C) = V ′(C) for all C ⊂ A, hence Π = Π′. To




ua(Mta) and let D∗ ⊂ Dh
such that V (hDh) = V (hD∗) i.e. D∗ is the optimal subset of doctors among Dh.
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V (hD∗) = V ′(hD∗) = V ′(hDh) = V (hDh).
Lemma 2.6. Let Π ⊂ RA be the set of payos arising from stable allocations in
market {ua}A. Let {u′a}A be a division of {ua}A such that u′d(h) = 0 for all h ∈
H. Then (πH , πD) = π ∈ Π if and only if πh = v′h(πD) and πD is a Walrasian
Equilibrium Price in the division {u′a}A.
Proof. Since (πH , πD) = π ∈ Π implies that πh = V (hDh) −
∑
Dh
πd if h is matched
to Dh and πh ≥ V (hD′h) −
∑
D′h
πd for every D′h ⊂ D, then πh = v′h(πD) and πD is a
Walrasian Equilibrium Price in the division {u′a}A.
For completion, as the following results are well-known, we include the proofs for
Proposition 2.
Proposition. 2.2 In all matching markets,
 πMtDd = V (A)− V (A \ d) for every d ∈ D. Leonard (1983)
 πMtHd = V (dA) − V (A) for every d ∈ D. Gul and Stacchetti (1999). Where
V (Ad) is the value of a market where an identical doctor d is added.
Proof. We show that πMtDd = V (A) − V (A \ d) for every d ∈ D. Let MtD be the
doctors optimal matching. Fix d, if d is unassigned in MtD, then the result follows.
If d is assigned to hospital h, let M ′t′D be a matching where everything is identical
to MtD but td and d are removed. In this market, h holds whatever doctors he is
assigned at the current transfers since h preferences satisfy the substitutes condi-
tion. Since the new allocation is stable, it is ecient. Hence
∑
A\d







πMtDd , then d can increase his payo in the orig-
inal market, contradicting the maximality of πMtDd . Thus π
MtD
d = V (A) − V (A \ d).
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To show that πMtHd = V (Ad) − V (A) for every d ∈ D. Consider a market with
agents A plus a copy of doctor d and a new hospital h′. Let uh′(d) < V (Ad)− V (A)
and zero otherwise. In this new market h′ does not get d (or his copy) in any stable
allocation and hence πMtHd ≥ V (Ad) − V (A) since (π
MtH
D ) constitute a Walrasian
Equilibrium. Suppose now that uh′(d) > V (Ad) − V (A) and zero otherwise. Now
in every stable allocation h′ gets d (or his copy) and hence πd ≤ V (Ad) − V (A)
for any stable allocation in the economy Ah′d. Since any stable allocation in Ah′d
induces a stable allocation in A we have πMtHd ≤ V (Ad) − V (A). Hence π
MtH
d =
V (Ad)− V (A).
Theorem. 2.1 Suppose V satises the opportunity cost condition in the continuous
transfers market, then πMtHh = V (A)− V (A \ h) for every h ∈ H.
Proof. We rst show that πMtHh ≤ V (A) − V (A \ h) for all h ∈ H. Without loss
of generality, consider the division where all surplus belongs to hospitals. To show
that πMtHh ≤ V (A) − V (A \ h) for all h ∈ H. Let h be any hospital and let π
MtH
h
be its maximum stable payo, then πMtHh = V (A) −
∑
A\h
πMtHa . Since the hospi-
tal preferred stable allocation belongs to the core, we have
∑
A\h
πMtHa ≥ V (A/h).
Hence the result. For the converse, without loss of generality, consider the divi-
sion where all surplus belongs to hospitals. For notational simplicity let s∗ be the
set of doctors for hospital s at the doctor optimal stable allocation when hospi-
tal h is not present and let let s∗ be the set of doctors for hospital s at the hospital
optimal stable allocation when hospital h is present. Let π∗ and π∗ be the corre-













π∗d = vs(π∗) +
∑
s∗
(π∗d − π∗d) i.e
0 ≥ vs(π∗) − vs(π∗) +
∑
s∗






























vs(π∗) − vs(π∗) +
∑
s∗
(π∗d − π∗d)] +
∑
h∗
(π∗d − π∗d). Since the second and
third components are non-positive we have V (A) − V (A/h) ≤ vh(π∗) (the third
component is non-positive by the opportunity cost condition).
Lemma. 2.1 and 2.3. Both VCG and U-VCG for agents in B are strategy-proof for
agents in B.
Proof. Suppose agent b ∈ B has preferences ub and the reported and known pref-
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Hence, VCG is strategy-proof for b. The proof for U -VCG is analogous.
Corollary. 2.1 The VCG for Hospitals is stable and strategy-proof.
Proof. The VCG for hospitals is always strategy-proof and and delivers playos
equal to V (A)− V (A \ h) for every h ∈ H. According to the previous theorem these
payos are identical to the hospital-optimal stable payos. Thus, VCG is stable.
Corollary 2.2. In auction markets, VCG payments coincide with the value of the
assigned goods at the lowest Walrasian Equilibrium.
Lemma. 2.2 Unit demand and linear hospital preferences satisfy the opportunity
cost condition.
Proof. Suppose that πMtHh = V (A) − V (A \ h) for all h ∈ H and x a hospital
h∗, then there is a stable matching in the market without h∗ in which all agents
receive πMtHa . By construction for any C ⊂ A \ h∗,
∑
C





πMtHa . In the market without h
∗ doctor d has an optimal stable payo of
V (A \ h∗) − V (A \ h∗d) (by Leonard's theorem) and V (A \ h∗) − V (A \ h∗d) ≥
πMtHd = V (Ad) − V (A), where the inequality comes from the optimality of the
doctor-optimal stable payo and the equality from Gul and Stacchetti's theorem.
Leonard's theorem shows that πMtHh = V (A) − V (A \ h) for all h ∈ H in the unit
demand case. For the linear case we show directly that πMtHh = V (A) − V (A \
h) for all h ∈ H. Fix a hospital h∗ and let B the set of doctors matched with h∗.
Let every doctor in B who has a payo equal to his outside option be unmatched.
For every other d ∈ B, there is a hospital h′, set of doctors A and D ⊂ B such
that V (h′AD) =
∑
a∈h′AB
πMtHa . Let C be the set of doctors assigned to h
′. We show
that V (h′CB) =
∑
a∈h′CB











πMtHh′ − V (h′A)), the term in brackets is non-negative by the stability of MtH and













πMtHa imply the result.
Theorem. 2.2 Let π ∈ Π, then there is a division such that πUa = πa, i.e. there is a
division of surplus such that the U-VCG mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for
all agents.
Proof. Let xa be the match of agent a in an ecient allocation. Let ua(xa) = πa.
For any h and set of doctors Dh 6= xh let uh(Dh) = V (Dhh) −
∑
d∈Dh∩xh
πd. For any d
and h 6= xd let ud(h) = 0. With this division, the allocation is stable whenever any
agent reports a zero value for every match, hence ecient.
Theorem. 2.3 Let Ua be agent a's private value in an ecient assignment. Sup-
pose no agent's information is pivotal. i.e. removing one agent's information does
not change the ecient assignment, and (Ua)A ∈ Π, then the U-VCG mechanism is
strategy-proof for all agents and stable.
Proof. By construction, the U -VCG mechanism is strategy-proof for all agents, if
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no agents information is pivotal, then U(A)− U(A \ a) is equal to the private value
Ua for every agent, which by assumption belongs to Π.
Lemma. 2.5 Let πUh (α) the payo assigned to hospital h by the hospital U-VCG
mechanism, then πUh is a monotone increasing piecewise linear function satisfying:
 πUh (0) = 0 and π
U








πUh (0) = V (hDh) and
d
dα
πUh (0) = 0, where Dh is the set of doctors assigned
to h at the ecient matching.




uMta + (1− α)V (hDh). By the en-
velope theorem (see for example Milgrom and Segal (2002)) U(A/h)(α) is a piece-
wise linear function and U(A/h)(α) is monotone (since V (hDh) ≥ 0 for all h and
Dh that are ever chosen at the optimum). Hence πUh (α) = U(A) − U(A \ h)(α)
is an increasing piecewise linear function such that πUh (0) = 0, π
U
h (1) = V (A) −
V (A \ h), d
dα
πUh (0) = V (hDh) where Dh is the set of doctors matched with h and
d
dα
πUh (1) = 0. Since π
U
h (0) = 0 and
d
dα
πUh (0) = V (hDh) ≥ V (A) − V (A \ h) we have
πUh (α) ≥ α(V (A)− V (A \ h)) for all α ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem. 2.4 Suppose preferences are linear and Π has a non-empty interior. Let
hd be the hospital matched with d at the ecient matching.
 If the lowest stable payo for every hospital is zero and V (hdd) > V (h
′d) for
all d and h′ 6= hd, then there is β ∈ (0, 1) such that for any α ∈ [0, β] πUh (α)
for all h ∈ H is stable.
 If for every doctor there are at least two hospitals h, h′ such that V (hd) > 0
and V (h′d) > 0, then there is β ∈ (0, 1) such that for any α ∈ [β, 1] πUh (α) for
all h ∈ H is stable.
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Proof. Since the lowest stable payo for every hospital is zero, πU(0) is stable. Since
V (hdd) > V (h
′d) for all d and h′ 6= hd, it is possible to increase h payo by ε > 0
and have a set of stable payos, i.e. it is possible to reduce the payo of all doc-
tors matched with hospital h without them being able to form a blocking coalition.
Hence ε(V (h1Dh1), · · · , V (hHDH)) is a stable payo for hospitals for ε suciently
small. Let β = sup{ε > 0|ε(V (h1Dh1), · · · , V (hHDH)) is a stable payoff}. Since Π
is a convex closed set we have the result.
Suppose that for every doctor there are at least two hospitals h, h′ such that V (hd) >
0 and V (h′d) > 0. Suppose there is a hospital h such that d
dα
πUh (α) > 0 for ev-
ery α ∈ (ε, 1) for every ε > 0. This implies that for all α ∈ (ε, 1), πUh (α) =
V (hD∗h) > 0 i.e. hospital h is assigned doctors in D
∗
h, even when they produce a
surplus V (hD∗h)(1 − α); however, there for every doctor in D∗h there is another hos-
pital h′ such that V (h′d) > V (h′d)(1 − α). Thus for every h there is εh for which
πUh (α) = 0 for all α ∈ [εh, 1]. Let β = max{εh}.
Theorem. 2.5 Suppose preferences are integer valued, then strategy-proofness and
stability are possible in any q-market for any q ∈ Z such that q ≥ 1.
Proof. Suppose the VCG mechanism is used. If preferences are integer valued, then
agent b payment is equal to pb = ub(Mb) −W ′(A) + W ′(A \ b) ∈ Z. If in addition,
q ≥ 1 all possible payments are implementable as a matching. Hence, strategy-
proofness and stability are possible in the ∞-market.
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Chapter 3: The Power of Weak Incentives
Abstract. A social planner would like a socially optimal outcome to be chosen in
an environment with externalities. The standard approach to solving the social plan-
ner's problem is to design mechanisms with desirable incentive properties such as
strategy-proofness or equilibrium uniqueness. These mechanisms make the desired
outcome a Nash equilibrium and rely on agents' rationality to coordinate on it. I
introduce mechanisms with weak incentives to oer a dierent approach. These
mechanisms make the desired outcome a Nash equilibrium, but rely on agents' be-
havioral traits - instead of rationality - to coordinate on the desired outcome. A
mechanism with weak incentives is an indirect mechanism in which the payo of
agent i does not depend on his report. These mechanisms shed light on the relative
importance between making the desired outcome a Nash equilibrium and oering in-
centives to coordinate on it. As an application, I show that in large economies, if
players' reports are true on average, mechanisms with weak incentives solve the so-
cial planner's problem. I demonstrate this result using an experimental congestion
game. In the lab, a mechanism with weak incentives realized 95% of the eciency
achieved by a social planner with full information. This suggest that lie-aversion, a
well-established behavioral trait, can be used to design eective mechanisms.
Ever since Hurwicz (1972) introduced the concept of incentive compatibility, the ac-
cepted wisdom has been that the minimal requirement to implement a social goal is
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to have a mechanism in which the social optimum is a Nash equilibrium. In prac-
tice, however, the standard approach has been to require stronger incentive prop-
erties because incentive compatible mechanisms potentially have undesired Nash
equilibria, or their desired Nash equilibria might not be easy to reach. This ap-
proach has been used in kidney exchange (Roth et al. (2004)), school choice (Ab-
dulkadirouglu and Sönmez (2003)) and military assignments (Sönmez and Switzer
(2013)).
Providing strong incentive properties has been successful in practice, but it has lim-
ited the study of mechanisms in at least three ways: i) it is not applicable to prob-
lems that are incompatible with these incentive properties, ii) it fails to incorporate
behavioral traits as a model of human behavior and iii) it leaves many interesting
questions out of the scope. The rst limitation is well-understood, but it has typi-
cally been addressed by replacing one incentive property for another. This swap is
not always possible. The second limitation is more delicate. There is evidence that
mechanisms with strong incentive properties sometimes work and sometimes fail.
Typically, their success is attributed to their incentives; however, this interpreta-
tion is inconsistent with their failures. Furthermore, there is evidence that mecha-
nisms without strong incentives properties sometimes succeed. These observations
are consistent with the existence of behavioral traits. Finally, once behavioral traits
are acknowledged, it is possible to investigate, for example, if some strategy-proof
mechanisms are signicantly better than others.
This paper addresses the second limitation and shows that behavioral traits can be
as eective as strong incentive properties in solving social problems. Specically,
this paper i) introduces mechanisms with weak incentives  the minimal incentives
for the social goal to be a rational choice, and ii) shows that these mechanism can
rely on behavioral traits to solve externality problems in big economies. The ob-
jective is to achieve eciency in an environment with externalities: each agent in
65
a group must select an action, but the ecient prole of actions depends on the
agents' private information. In this environment, a mechanism with weak incentives
is an indirect mechanism in which each individual selects an action and reports his
private information. The mechanism assigns prices that reect the externalities pro-
duced by each action. These mechanisms possess the ecient prole of actions as
a Nash equilibrium, but do not incentivize the truthful revelation of private infor-
mation. Hence, this class of mechanisms constitutes a natural way to dene the
incremental value of incentives.
The main drawback of using mechanisms with weak incentives is that they gener-
ically possess many equilibria because best responses are thick, as all reports are
associated with the same payo for any given action. This does not prevent them
from solving the social planner's problem. Suppose, for example, that agents have
a tendency to report the truth when they cannot prot from misrepresenting their
private information. In this case, a mechanism with weak incentives would be as
eective as a mechanism with stronger incentive properties. This is indeed the typ-
ical assumption of strategy-proof mechanisms, as they also often possess equilibria
other than truth-telling.
Of course, human beings might or might not report their private information when
confronted with weak incentives. The question is for actual human behavior: What
kind of problems can be eectively solved? This paper explores this question by
showing that externality problems in big economies can be eectively solved by
mechanisms with weak incentives for a large class of behavioral assumptions. Their
eectiveness is conrmed in the experimental laboratory using a congestion prob-
lem.
Mechanisms with weak incentives are eective in solving externality problems in
which average truth-telling is sucient for achieving eciency. For example, the
ecient provision of a public good requires that the sum of net benets is accu-
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rately signed; if some agents overstate their values while others shade by the same
amount, the result would still be ecient.1 Analogously, correcting a negative ex-
ternality requires the calculation of the social marginal cost, which typically is the
sum of individual marginal costs of aected parties. In these cases, the welfare
function depends on the average private value, not on each individual value. Knowl-
edge of the average type at the ecient outcome is enough to implement it. Hence,
actions can be priced correctly even if some agents misrepresent their private infor-
mation.
To study the coordination problem, this paper uses non-equilibrium adjustment
processes. These processes characterize how agents select actions and reports, given
a current prole of actions and reports. This tool is commonly used in evolution-
ary game theory. It is shown that a concave welfare function is sucient for a large
class of non-equilibrium adjustment processes to converge to the ecient Nash equi-
librium in problems characterized by the average type. Both conditions, depen-
dence on average values and concavity of the welfare function, are common in eco-
nomic problems. This theoretical result provides reasons to believe that this class of
mechanism could be eective in real life. However, the true test of the eectiveness
of a mechanism is empirical.
A trac congestion game is used to test the eectiveness of a mechanism with weak
incentives in the experimental laboratory. Trac congestion represents an ideal
application. It is a big problem in which a very large number of agents play each
1The purchase (or funding) of a unit of public good by one agent has a positive externality on
other agents.
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other repeatedly.2 Commuters have heterogeneous values of commuting and time.3
The welfare function is concave and depends on the average value of time. In prin-
ciple, a social planner could ensure ecient behavior by introducing a congestion
price equal to the social marginal cost at the ecient level of trac. In practice,
however, policymakers lack the information to set such a price.4 A mechanism de-
sign approach is still necessary.
The experimental design consists of a driving game in which 14 subjects indepen-
dently decide whether to drive or not drive on a xed road for 30 rounds of play.
At the beginning of the game, every subject was randomly and privately assigned
two numbers: i) a value of commuting and ii) a value of time. Neither the distribu-
tion nor the support of values was revealed to the subjects. Types were chosen to
fulll the following three functions: (i) replicate a large market, (ii) minimize the
set of agents who belong to both the Nash equilibrium without congestion pricing
and the social optimum, and (iii) allow for zero eciency gains with the message
mechanism.
Two main treatments were considered: no price and message price. The rst treat-
ment represents a situation with no congestion prices and the second uses a mech-
anism with weak incentives. The message price treatment uses agents' messages
2Empirical studies have found that the loss of welfare due to trac congestion is between $32
and $121 billion dollars every year in the United States. According to Schrank et al. (2012), the
congestion invoice for the cost of extra time and fuel in 498 urban areas in 2011 was (in 2011
dollars): $121 billion. On the other hand, Litman (2014) considers that $32 is a more appropriate
value, as the former report consider a value of time unreasonable high. The value of time consid-
ered by the former is $16.79 per hour and $8.37 by the latter. These studies also have a dierent
position on the ecient level of congestion.
3The value of commuting is the utility derived from getting from A to B. The value of time is
the opportunity cost of every unit of time spent on the road.
4This lack of information is a problem that no system has been able to solve in practice. For
example, both the Congestion Charge in London and Singapore's Area Licensing Scheme, which
are deemed the most successful congestion systems in the world, use demand estimations and an
objective level of congestion to set the congestion price to be charged to drivers. Z.F. Li (1999)
describes the evolution the the Singapore's Area Licensing Scheme, which originally had a tar-
get reduction of 25% - 30%. According to the transport for London report (2003), the London's
congestion charging was originally intended to reduce trac by 10% - 15%.
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about their value of time and the observed level of trac to calculate congestion
prices. Trac observations are used to measure the marginal impact, in time, of
adding an extra vehicle to the road. Messages are used to measure the cost of the
marginal increase in time.
Four additional treatments were considered to provide control and robustness to
the ndings. The xed price treatment provides a measure of the maximum observ-
able eciency. This treatment considers a social planner with access to all private
information and imposes the optimal xed congestion price in all rounds. The dy-
namic price treatment follows the same structure of the message price, but behaves
as if all agents reported the truth all the time. The balanced treatment considers
budget-balanced versions of the dynamic and message treatments. The random
treatment considers random types instead of the constructed types used in other
treatments.
The experimental results are promising. Eciency is measured with respect to the
observed eciency achieved by the xed price treatment, as this treatment repre-
sents the maximum possible eciency a policymaker could achieve in a real situ-
ation. The observed eciencies are as follows: 65.90% (13.01%) for the no price
treatment and 95.00% (3.44%) for the message treatment.5 The random treatment
achieved an eciency of 91.74% (9.3%).6 However, when one of the six sessions is
omitted, the eciency of the random treatment becomes 95.65% (3.2%). The low
eciency, 72.21%, achieved by one of the random sessions was due to the small
scale of the experiment. In the controlled sessions, types were chosen to represent
a big market. In the low eciency session, 4 out of 14 subjects had a market power
5The standard deviation is reported in brackets. The paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test was
used to reject the null hypothesis that the treatments with congestion prices achieve the same
eciency as the treatment with no price. In all cases the null was rejected at a condence level of
99%.
6This eciency is measured with respect to the maximum theoretical eciency associated with
each draw of random types. The theoretical eciency associated with the message price treatment
is 91.46% (3.31%).
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inconsistent with a big market.
This paper is related to the literature on mechanism design, the growing literature
on behavioral implementation, and the well-established literature on congestion
pricing.
The inconsistent performance of strong rational incentives provides evidence that
human behavior - not accounted for in the rational model - plays a role in the suc-
cess of many mechanisms. The most famous, but not unique, example of a mecha-
nism that fails despite providing strong rational incentives is the second price auc-
tion, which is strategy-proof. Kagel et al. (1987) report an experiment in which
bidders do not report their true value.7 Attiyeh et al. (2000) and Kawagoe and
Mori (2001) report experiments in which another strategy-proof mechanism, a ver-
sion of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, achieve rates of truth-telling
as low as 10%. There are mechanisms that display the opposite behavior. Double
auctions are the most well-known example of a mechanism that is typically not in-
centive compatible, but performs well most of the times. Smith (1962; 1980) shows
that the double auction mechanism consistently achieves the competitive equilib-
rium outcome despite agents' manipulation possibilities. Budish and Kessler (2014)
show that the mechanism for the fair allocation of indivisible goods without money
proposed by Budish (2011) performs well in practice, despite providing opportuni-
ties for manipulation.8
The above inconsistencies have led to two dierent views towards behavioral traits.
The rst view considers that mechanisms should be robust to behavioral traits.
Saijo et al. (2007) propose double implementation, both in Nash and weakly dom-
inant strategies. Li (2015) proposes implementation in obviously-strategy-proof
7This is a prevalent phenomenon as Kawagoe and Mori (2001); Kagel and Levin (1993) report
similar ndings.
8Similarly, Che and Tercieux (2015) propose a mechanism which is neither strategy-proof, nor
stable, nor ecient to obtain a matching that approximately obtains the three properties.
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strategies.9 These notions exacerbate the rst limitation mentioned above, as they
are harder to provide in practice. Bierbrauer et al. (2014) considers mechanisms
that are robust to individuals with social preferences. Their characterization de-
pends on payo equivalent reports, a characteristic also present in this paper. Farhi
and Gabaix (2015) implement an optimal tax scheme with behavioral agents who
might not perfectly optimize their budgets, and they show that the optimal tax
scheme is simple, a characteristic shared with this paper. These similarities are in
spirit, not in the letter. However, they might help us understand how behavioral
implementation is dierent or similar to rational implementation. de Clippel (2014)
shows they are not entirely dierent, but that their connection is still not well un-
derstood. The second view leverages on behavioral traits to achieve social goals.
This paper belongs to this second branch. In this branch there are several papers
that explore mechanisms without strong incentives, but do not explicitly address
how the desired Nash equilibrium is reached. Abdulkadiro§lu et al. (2011) and Ab-
dulkadiro§lu et al. (2015) propose a non-truth-telling mechanism for school choice
that improves upon a strategy-proof mechanism but provide no evidence that these
gains could be realized in practice or how. Featherstone and Niederle (2015) shows
experimentally that these non-truth-telling equilibria might me very dicult to
reach in practice and propose a truth-telling-not-strategy-proof mechanism, how-
ever, their experiments only suggest a potential for truth-telling-not-strategy-proof
mechanisms, since they do not explicitly address how their subjects reach equilib-
rium. There are papers that use non-equilibrium strategies as means of implemen-
tation. Fragiadakis and Troyan (2015) shows that focal, non-equilibrium, strategies
can be used to improve eciency in an assignment game. In contrast to the men-
tioned papers, this paper: i) deals with externalities instead of assignment games,
9A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviating strategy, starting from any earliest in-
formation set where both diverge, the best possible outcome from the latter is no better than the
worst possible outcome of the former.
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ii) provides a general framework for understanding equilibrium selection in terms of
behavioral traits, iii) shows explicitly that average-truth-telling is sucient to con-
verge to the ecient outcome, and iv) designs an experiment that allows one to at-
tribute the success of the mechanism to the aforementioned behavioral trait. Both
Featherstone and Niederle (2015) and Fragiadakis and Troyan (2015) experimental
results can be interpreted as leveraging on the agents' tendency to report the truth
- a feature also present in this paper and well-established in the behavioral game
theory literature (Gneezy (2005); Erat and Gneezy (2012); Gneezy et al. (2013)).
This paper is also related to the literature on congestion abatement systems. Ex-
ternalities and externality abatement have been studied consistently at least since
Pigou (1920), who proposed to charge agents the value of the marginal externality
they produce at the ecient social allocation. As mentioned before, this approach
requires information not available to the policymaker. Many solutions have been
studied. For example, Sandholm (2002; 2005; 2010) provides a systematic treatment
of the dynamics of congestion prices in continuous time. Both Li (2002) and Yang
et al. (2004) provide evidence that prices can also be adjusted in discrete time.
Yang and Wang (2011) study systems of tradable permits. They show that the sys-
tem can achieve full eciency when the market for permits is perfectly competi-
tive. Continuing their work, Wang et al. (2014) showed that the system of tradable
permits can be guaranteed to achieve the social optimum allocation by adjusting
the quantity of permits according to the observed price in the permits market. Nie
(2012) have shown that these tradable permit systems are very sensitive to transac-
tion costs in the permits market. Guo and Yang (2010) show that, when demand is
xed, it is possible to achieve budget balancedness using an appropriate combina-
tion of taxes and subsidies. The message system can achieve budget balancedness
even when demand respond to prices. Several studies have taken congestion games
to the experimental lab. Schneider and Weimann (2004), Selten et al. (2007), and
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Hartman (2012) study route choice behavior with and without congestion prices.
Rapoport et al. (2004) and Rapoport et al. (2014) study entry games with and
without congestion prices. In both the experimental and theoretical literature on
congestion, it is assumed that the policymaker or mechanism knows the value of
the externality i.e. knows every agents' value of time and that this value is homo-
geneous. The theory and experiment in this paper do not assume knowledge of pri-
vate information nor its homogeneity in the population.
3.1 Mechanisms with weak incentives
This section introduces mechanisms with weak incentives in a general framework to
highlight the interactions between rational incentives, information, and behavioral
traits in mechanisms designed to solve the social planer's problem in an environ-
ment with externalities. The purpose of these mechanisms is to isolate behavioral
traits as an equilibrium renement. These mechanisms oer the social optimum
as a Nash equilibrium, but do not incentivize agent's to coordinate on it. Further-
more, it is assumed that agents have private information, but lack common knowl-
edge of the distribution of types. The informational assumption might hold in some
real life applications.
Consider a set of agents N = {1, . . . , N}. Agents must select an action simultane-
ously and independently from each other. Agent i selects actions from the nite set
Xi. An action prole x = (x1, . . . , xN) describes an action for each agent. The set
of action proles is denoted by X = ΠNXi. Agent i is described entirely by his type
θi ∈ Θi. Types are private information. Let θ = (θ1, . . . , θN) and Θ = ΠNΘi.
Individuals have quasilinear utility functions vi(x, θi, t) = ui(x, θi) + t, where
ui : X × Θi → R depends on everyone actions and i's private information. Agent i
knows his type θi and his set of strategies Xi, but does not know the distribution of
types.
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The prole of actions x ∈ X is ecient at θ if
∑
N ui(x, θi) ≥
∑
N ui(y, θi) for all
y ∈ X. The eciency level associated with an action prole x at θ is V (x, θ) =∑
N ui(x, θi). The set of ecient proles of actions at θ is denoted by x
∗(θ). A pro-
le of actions x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium at θ if vi(xi, x−i, θi) ≥ vi(yi, x−i, θi) for
all yi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ N . The set of Nash equilibria at θ is denoted by x(θ). In
many situations there is no ecient Nash equilibrium i.e. x(θ)∩x∗(θ) = ∅. Consider
the following example.
Example 3.1. Consider a situation with two agents N = {1, 2} and actions X1 =
{a1, b1} and X2 = {a2, b2}. Each agent has two possible types: Θ1 = {θ1, θ′1} and
Θ2 = {θ2, θ′2}. Suppose payos are as follow:
(θ1, θ2) a2 b2
a1 4, 3 2, 2




a1 4, 3 2, 4
b1 3, 1 1, 2
(θ′1, θ2) a2 b2
a1 2, 3 4, 2




a1 2, 3 4, 4
b1 3, 1 5, 2
The ecient prole of actions and Nash equilibria are as follow: x∗(θ1, θ2) = (b1, a2)
and x(θ1, θ2) = (a1, a2), x∗(θ′1, θ2) = (b1, b2) and x(θ
′




(a1, a2) and x(θ1, θ′2) = (a1, b2), x
∗(θ′1, θ
′




2) = (b1, b2).
A social planner would like to ensure that a member of x∗(θ) is chosen by the agents
for all θ ∈ Θ by introducing a mechanism. A mechanism is a pair M, g, with M =
ΠNMi and g : M → O, where Mi is player's i message space and O = X×RN is the
outcome space. A mechanism assigns a prole of actions gx(m) and transfers gt(m)
for every prole of messages m = (m, . . . ,mN). A message prole m is a Nash equi-
librium at θ ∈ Θ if vi(gx(mi,m−i), θi, gt,i(mi,m−i)) ≥ vi(gx(m′i,m−i), θi, gt,i(m′i,m−i))
for all m′i ∈Mi and i ∈ N . The set of Nash equilibria in the mechanism M, g at θ is
denoted by mg(θ). The mechanism M, g is ecient whenever x∗(θ) ∩ gx(mg(θ)) 6= ∅
74
for all θ ∈ Θ. In this case m∗g(θ) is a selection of mg(θ) such that gx(m∗g(θ)) ∈ x∗(θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ. A message mi is a dominant strategy for agent i at θi if
vi(gx(mi,m−i), θi, gt,i(mi,m−i)) ≥ vi(gx(m′i,m−i), θi, gt,i(m′i,m−i)) for all m′i ∈ Mi
and m−i ∈ M−i = ΠN\iMj. A mechanism M, g is budget balanced at m ∈ M if∑
N ti(m) ≤ 0. It is assumed that the social planner knows Θ, but not the distribu-
tion of types.
It is widely accepted that the existence of an ecient mechanism is not sucient to
guarantee that x∗(θ) will be chosen by the agents for all θ ∈ Θ because there might
be multiple equilibria. This problem has been addressed in many dierent ways.
For example, oering a unique equilibrium guarantees that the only rational choice
is the desired outcome and making truth-telling a weakly dominant strategy makes
it easier to coordinate in the truth-telling equilibrium even when there are other
equilibria. There are many other options, but all of them share one characteristic:
they limit the set of problems that can be solved and demand a level of rationality
that might not be available in practice. This paper oers an alternative approach
for dealing with multiple equilibria: rely on agents' behavior to coordinate on the
desired outcome. This is done by providing a mechanism that has the desired out-
come x∗(θ) as a Nash equilibrium, but does not incentivize agents to select it. This
class of mechanism posses weak incentives.
A mechanism M, g is a mechanism with weak incentives if Mi = Xi × Θi, gx(x, θ) =
x and gt(x, θ) = p : X × Θ → RN is such that is such that vi(x, θi, pi(x, θ′i, θ̂−i)) =
vi(x, θi, pi(x, θ
′′
i , θ̂−i)) for all x ∈ X, θ′i, θ′′i ∈ Θi and θ̂−i ∈ Θ−i. Agents select an
action and send a report about their type, but their payo does not depend on the
particular report they send. Hence, this class of mechanisms do not incentivize the
revelation of private information. As in the case of direct mechanisms, it is possible
to choose p such that (x∗(θ), θ) becomes a Nash equilibrium for all θ ∈ Θ. For each
agent, pi is a list of prices for each action in Xi. The construction of an ecient set
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of prices p relies on the celebrated Vickrey - Clarke - Groves mechanism (VCG).10
The VCG mechanism is an ecient direct mechanism with M = Θ, gx(m) ∈
argmax
y
V (y,m) and gt,i(m) =
∑
N\i uj(x(m),mj) − hi(m−i), where hi : Θ−i → R.
Truth-telling is a dominant strategy in the VCG mechanism. To obtain an ecient
mechanism with weak incentives, let pi(x, θ) =
∑
N\i uj(x, θj) − hwi (x−i, θ−i) be the
price associated with xi when other agents select x−i, where hi : X−i × Θ−i → R.
These prices dene the weak VCG mechanism (wVCG). Both transfers and prices
can be set to represent the marginal impact of the introduction of an agent, in the
case of the VCG, or the selection of an action, for the wVCG. This is achieved by
setting hi(m−i) = max
∑
N\i uj(x,mj) for all i ∈ N for VCG and selecting a default




i , x−i), θj) for all
i ∈ N for wVCG. Unless otherwise noted, these transfers and prices will be used
in all examples. The dierences between the VCG and the wVCG are illustrated in
the following example.
Example 3.2. Consider the problem from example 1. The games induced by VCG
and wVCG with default x0 = (b1, b2) when the true state of the world is (θ1, θ2)
are shown below. Transfers and prices are added to (or subtracted from) the payo
associated with each prole of messages.
10Vickrey (1961); Clarke (1971); Groves (1973)
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VCG
(θ1, θ2) θ2 θ
′
2
θ1 3 + 0, 5− 1 4− 1, 3 + 0
θ′1 1− 1, 4 + 0 2 + 0, 2− 1
wVCG
(θ1, θ2) a2, θ2 a2, θ
′
2 b2, θ2 b2, θ
′
2
a1, θ1 4− 2, 3 + 2 4 + 2, 3 + 2 2− 2, 2 + 0 2 + 2, 2 + 0
a1, θ
′
1 4− 2, 3− 2 4 + 2, 3− 2 2− 2, 2 + 0 2 + 2, 2 + 0
b1, θ1 3 + 0, 5 + 2 3 + 0, 5 + 2 1 + 0, 4 + 0 1 + 0, 4 + 0
b1, θ
′
1 3 + 0, 5− 2 3 + 0, 5− 2 1 + 0, 4 + 0 1 + 0, 4 + 0
In wVCG, there are 4 Nash equilibria
m(θ) = {(b1, θ1, a2, θ2), (a1, θ1, a2, θ′2), (b1, θ′1, a2, θ2), (b1, θ′1, b2, θ2)}
in VCG m(θ1, θ2) = (θ1, θ2) is the unique equilibrium in dominant strategies. Both
mechanism are ecient.
The following propositions show some properties of mechanisms with weak incen-
tives. All proofs are in the appendix.
Proposition 3.1. There is an ecient mechanism with weak incentives, namely
the wVCG.
A mechanism with weak incentives makes the ecient allocation a rational choice
i.e. any x ∈ x∗(θ) can be supported as a Nash equilibrium, however, agents are not
incentivized to reveal their private information. This weakening in solution concept,
with respect to strategy-proofness, allows for some new possibilities. In particular,
budget balancedness is always possible to obtain.
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Proposition 3.2. There is a budget balanced mechanism with weak incentives for
any prole of actions. In particular, any ecient prole of actions can be supported
as a budget balanced Nash equilibrium.
In some applications sending a report and selecting an action could be dicult for
the agents or for the agency collecting the prices. In these cases, decisions could be
preferably made sequentially. The next proposition shows that eciency can also
be achieved in this manner.
Proposition 3.3. Any ecient prole of actions can be supported as a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of a sequential mechanism with weak incentives.
The above propositions and example show crucial dierences between VCG and
wVCG. VCG induces the ecient prole of actions by incentivizing the revela-
tion of private information while wVCG allows for eciency without incentivizing
agents to select the socially desirable outcome. The wVCG mechanism depends
completely on agents' behavioral traits to coordinate on the desired outcome. The
next section develops the idea of behavioral traits as an equilibrium renement.
3.2 Mechanisms with weak incentives in large average economies
This section develops a model in which behavioral traits are used as an equilibrium
renement for a mechanism with weak incentives. In this model, agents can adjust
their strategies over time, allowing the emergence of the desired Nash equilibrium
as a social convention. The model is developed in continuous time and agents for
technical convenience.
Agents have a common and nite set of actions S = {1, . . . , S} with typical ele-
ment s.11 The common set of types Θ is nite with typical element θ = (θ1, θ2),
11This can be done without loss of generality by letting S = ∪NXi
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θj ∈ RS.12 There is a positive mass of agents µθ of each type θ. The mass of agents
of type θ doing s is denoted by xθs ≥ 0. Proles of actions are replaced by distri-
butions of actions x ∈ X = {x ∈ R|Θ|×|S|+ |
∑
s xθs = µθ}. The mass of agents,
of any type, doing s is denoted by xs ≥ 0. The anonymous distribution of ac-




θ µθ} describes what actions are being taken




An agent with type θ doing s has utility function uθs(x) = Fs(x′)θ1s + θ2s, where
F : X ′ → RS, F ∈ C2 is an observable externality function.13 To simplify notation,
F (x′) will be denoted by F (x). Types are scaled so that for every θ ∈ Θ there is an
















θ xθsθ2s represent the average type doing action s ∈ S. It is assumed
that W is strictly concave. The ecient distribution of actions x∗ is characterized
by the rst order conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker problem:14
Fs(x







x∗θjθ1j = λθ − λθs for all θ ∈ Θ, s ∈ S
λθ ≥ 0, λθ[
∑
x∗θj − µθ] = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ
λθs ≥ 0, λθ[x∗θs] = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, s ∈ S
(3.1)
A distribution of actions x constitutes a Nash equilibrium if vθs(x) = max
j∈S
vθj(x)
whenever xθs > 0. Equivalently, x is a Nash equilibrium if there is kθ ≥ 0 such that
vθs(x) = k whenever xθs > 0 and vθs(x) ≤ k whenever xθs = 0.
12This can be done without loss of generality by letting Θ = ∪NΘi
13If there are no externalities, there is no need for a mechanism as each agent could select his
favorite action without hurting others. Both positive and negative externalities are considered.











Pigou (1920) realized that eciency can be achieved in the presence of externalities






x∗θjθ1j for doing action s ∈ S would make the condition for optimality
and Nash equilibrium identical. To see this observe that the rst order conditions
imply the conditions for a Nash equilibrium with k = λθ, xθs > 0 implies that
Fs(x







x∗θjθ1j = λθ = k and xθs = 0 implies that Fs(x






x∗θjθ1j = λθ − λθs ≤ k.
The main problem with the above approach is that the ecient average type of ac-
tion s, θ̄∗1s = θ̄1s(x
∗), is unknown to the social planner. However, pricing an action








where x̃θj is the mass of agents reporting being of type θ. This pricing mechanism
is a mechanism with weak incentives. When these prices are used, the ecient dis-
tribution of actions can be supported as a Nash equilibrium.






x̃θjθ1j for all s ∈ S has multiple equilibria. In particular, for any xed dis-
tribution of type reports x̃, there is a Nash equilibrium x(x̃) that satises Fs(x(x̂))θ1s+
θ2s + ps(x(x̂), x̂) = kθ whenever x(x̂)θs > 0 and Fs(x(x̂))θ1s + θ2s + ps(x(x̂), x̂) ≤
kθ whenever x(x̂)θs = 0.
To understand if agents have any chance of coordinating in the ecient prole of
actions rst assume that agents always reveal their private information truthfully.







xθjθ1j would only depend on the current prole
of actions and the multiplicity of Nash equilibria disappears.15 In standard game
theory, it is almost always assumed that the existence of a single Nash equilibrium
is sucient for agents to coordinate on it. This section uses a dierent tool: evo-
lutionary game theory. This theory replaces the strong rational and informational
15When the identity of each individual in a continuum is considered, there is still a continuum
of equilibria as agents of a particular type could distribute themselves dierently and still respect
the aggregate distribution of types and actions.
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assumptions in standard game theory with assumptions about non-equilibrium be-
havior.16
Agents' individual actions determine a particular distribution of actions x. When x
is Nash equilibrium, it is in the best interest of all agents to follow it. Conversely,
when a non-equilibrium distribution of actions is specied, there is a positive mass
of agents who can gain by changing their action. However, it is not clear when a
sequence of non-equilibrium distributions of actions and their respective deviations
actually lead to a Nash equilibrium. Thus characterizing non-equilibrium behavior
is essential to study the convergence properties of mechanisms with weak incentives.
This approach species how actions associated with the same payo are chosen, a
critical element in the study of mechanism with weak incentives.
Mean dynamics and Lyapunov functions are introduced to characterize non-equilibrium
behavior. A mean dynamic V : X → R|Θ|×|S| is a function that denes an equation
of motion ẋ = V (x) on the space of distributions of actions. V is called admissible
if:
V is Lipschitz continuous
Vθs(x) ≥ 0 whenever xθs = 0∑
S
Vθs(x) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ
V (x) = 0 implies x is a Nash equilibrium
A function L : X → R such that ∇L(x)′V (x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X is a Lyapunov
function for V . An admissible mean dynamic V with Lyapunov function L has im-
portant properties: (i) there is a unique solution trajectory x : R+ → X from any
initial point x ∈ X, (ii) all solution trajectories stay in the space X, (iii) all rest
points of V are Nash equilibria, and (iv) all accumulation points of solution trajec-
tory x are critical points of L ◦ x.17 The following proposition shows that, when all
16Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), for example, have shown that reaching a Nash equilib-
rium instantaneously requires strong informational conditions.
17These are well-known results in the theory of dierential equations. The rst condition im-
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agents report their types truthfully, agents can successfully coordinate on the e-
cient Nash equilibrium.







xθjθ1j for all θ ∈ Θ and
s ∈ S and V an admissible mean dynamic such that V (x) · ∇W (x) > 0 whenever
V (x) 6= 0, then every solution trajectory of V converges to the ecient distribution
of actions x∗.
V satises V (x) · ∇W (x) > 0 for all x such that V (x) 66= 0 whenever, on aggregate,
agents adjust their actions by increasing their payos over time; this adjustment
does not need to be optimal for any agent, in particular, the payo for some indi-
vidual agents might decrease as long as the aggregate welfare increases.
If agents are not guaranteed to tell the truth, the pricing mechanism becomes a






x̃θjθ1j where x is the observable distribution of actions and x̃ is the re-
ported distribution of types. A mean dynamic V̂ : X̂ → R|Θ|×|S×Θ| describes both
the action and reporting behavior, where X̂ = {x̂ ∈ R|Θ|×|S×Θ|+ |
∑
s xθsθ̂ = µθ}.
x̂θsθ̂ is the mass of agents of type θ taking action s and reporting θ̂ as their type.
Letting xθs =
∑




θ̂ Vθsθ̂(ŷ) for every x̂ and
ŷ such that x = y, every mean dynamic V̂ induces a mean dynamic V by letting
Vθs(x) =
∑
θ̂ Vθsθ̂(x̂). Such a mean dynamic is called an average truth-telling dy-
namic if, in addition, its induced V is admissible and V (x) · ∇W (x) > 0 whenever
V (x) 6= 0.
Proposition 3.5. Let V̂ be an average truth-telling mean dynamic, then the mech-







x̂θjθ1j converges to the
ecient x∗distribution of actions.
plies existence of a solution to ẋ = V (x) by the PicardLindelöf theorem. The second and third
conditions guarantee that the solution does not leave X. The last condition follows the intuition
provided by the Nash equilibrium: agents at a Nash equilibrium do not change their actions while
agents in a non-equilibrium do. See Sandholm (2010) for an introduction.
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In theory, agents following an average truth-telling mean dynamic would converge
to the ecient distribution of actions. In practice, do agents converge to the e-
cient distribution of actions? The next section explores this question by using a
mechanism with weak incentives to solve an externality problem in the experimen-
tal laboratory. The experiment is framed as a trac congestion problem as real
trac involves a large number of agents who lack enough information about each
other to justify convergence to equilibrium by means of the rational model.
3.3 A trac congestion model
This sections specializes the model developed in section two to describe a trac
congestion problem and describe dierent interventions a social planner could im-
plement under dierent informational assumptions. These interventions are latter
tested in the experimental laboratory.
Real life trac congestion occurs when thousands of drivers use a road network.
During congested times, the marginal eect of each individual on the total conges-
tion is very small, but the total eect can be large. Drivers do not know each other,
and do not coordinate routes or departure times. These characteristics are better
captured by the continuous agents model.
A continuum of agents want to commute using a single road during a single peak
time of the day. The total time spent by each agent commuting is a function of
the number of agents on the road and is characterized by a strictly increasing and
strictly convex, twice dierentiable function t : R→ R+. There is a nite set of
types Θ, with typical element θ and mass denoted by µθ. Every type is character-
ized by two values: θ1d is the value of time and θ2d is the value of commuting. All
types have an outside option with value 0, staying home. All agents choose between
commuting and staying home, S = {d, h}.




µθ}, where xθd represents the mass of agents of type θ who drive. The utility re-




is no risk of confusion, x will be used to denote both the total number of drivers on
the road and the strategy distribution.
3.3.1 Congestion prices
A social planner would select a strategy distribution that maximizes welfare. The





The ecient distribution of actions is characterized by the rst order conditions in
(1). In real life, there are no social planners, but policy makers facing informational
and political constraints. In the following sections we analyze how a policy maker
could implement or approximate the social planner's solution under dierent infor-
mational and political constraints. Since t is observable it is assumed that policy
makers know t.
3.3.1.1 Full information
Suppose a policy maker had complete information about the commuting time func-
tion t and the mass of each type µθ, then he could calculate the optimal allocation







Assume that the policy maker has no information regarding the demand for com-
muting but can perfectly identify the types i.e. upon observing an agent, the policy
maker can identify θ1d but not θ2d. This is a very strong assumption, but allows the
study of the gradual loss of information from the policy maker's perspective. This
lack of information prevents the policy maker from implementing the optimal xed
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θd. In this case, the following dynamic congestion




3.3.1.3 Unknown demand and unknown social cost
Suppose the policy maker has no information regarding the demand or social cost.
Policy makers can observe the total number of drivers on the road, but cannot




θ1dxθd becomes impossible. The policy maker, however, could ask drivers
to report their value of time and observe trac; with this information, a mecha-
nism with weak incentives characterized by the following prices becomes a natural





On top of informational constraints, policy makers usually face political constraints.
In the case of externality abatement, the imposition of a congestion price is usually
seen as a bad alternative, since it involves a new tax. Hence it is important to
consider revenue neutral alternatives.
In the context of this model, revenue neutrality is simple to achieve since any con-
gestion price can be replaced by a smaller price on driving and a transfer for not















θ1dxθd, where µ =
∑
θ µθ. The analogous division can be implemented for
the message congestion price.
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3.4 A mechanism with weak incentives in the laboratory.
The main objective of the experiment is to test if the message system proposed
above allows drivers to converge to the socially optimal trac congestion level. The
previous section provides some evidence that, under average truth-telling, the social
optimum would be observed. The empirical eectiveness is tested in the experimen-
tal laboratory.
The experimental design consists of a driving game in which 14 subjects indepen-
dently decide whether to drive or not drive on a xed road for 30 rounds of
play.18 At the beginning of each game, every subject was randomly and privately
assigned a type characterized by two numbers: a value of commuting and a value of
time. These values are held xed over the 30 rounds of play. Neither the distribu-
tion nor the support of values was revealed to the subjects. There is a xed set of
types.
Types were chosen to fulll the following three functions: (i) produce at most one
marginal agent, (ii) minimize the set of agents who belong to both the Nash equi-
librium without congestion pricing and the social optimum, and (iii) allow for zero
eciency gains with the message congestion price.
Congestion occurs when thousands of drivers use the road at the same time. How-
ever, designing an experiment that requires thousands of subjects would be both
impractical and expensive. This large numbers problem is addressed through the
experimental design. When there is a large number of drivers, the impact of each
individual on one another is small. In particular, the small increase in travel time
produced by the introduction of one single driver to a road would change the deci-
sion of a small number of current drivers. This feature is reproduced in the exper-
iment by carefully selecting types. In the experiment, when an agent changes his
18In two out of nine session the number of drivers was 16.
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driving decision i.e. drives if he was not driving or the other way around, at most
one other agent nds it protable to change his behavior.
The goal of a congestion price is to change the behavior of agents. An eective sys-
tem would not only produce the right level of trac congestion, but also the right
set of drivers. In this experiment, types are used to minimize the set of agents who
belong to both the Nash equilibrium without congestion pricing and the social op-
timum. The equilibrium without congestion pricing consists of 10 drivers and the
social optimum consists of 6. However, only two drivers belong to both allocations.
In other words, 12 out of 14 agents have to change their behavior with the intro-
duction of congestion pricing. This radical change in the set of drivers is a strong
test for the eectiveness of the system.
Inevitably the message congestion price system will produce a continuum of equilib-
ria. The experimental design exploits this feature by providing the social optimum
and the outcome without congestion pricing as Nash equilibria. This prevents the
message price treatment from producing articial eciency gains.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 contain the list of types used in the experiment and illustrate
their distribution. The congestion function t(x) = x
3
12
was chosen to have commute
values and time values on a relatively equal scale.
Type Value of Value of No Congestion Social
Time Commuting Price Optimum
1 2.40 70.00 x x
2 3.60 80.00 x x
3 6.00 32.00 x
4 9.00 35.00 x
5 12.00 38.00 x
6 15.00 41.00 x
7 18.00 44.00 x
8 21.00 48.00 x
9 24.00 51.00 x
10 27.00 54.00 x
11 60.96 82.65 x
12 77.02 76.35 x
13 99.00 99.50 x
14 101.00 100.99 x
Figure 3.1: Type allocations
Value of Time
Value of Commuting












Figure 3.2: Experimental types
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In gure 3.2, every dot represents a type. The red line represents the equilibrium
time when there is no congestion price and the blue line represents the optimal
time when the optimal xed price is imposed. The gray lines are variations of time
when a driver is added or removed. When no congestion price is in place, all agents
above the red line would nd protable to drive; with the optimal xed congestion
price in place, only those above the blue line would nd protable to drive. Only
two types are above both lines. Suppose there is no congestion price and all the
agents above the red line are driving and consider the exit of one of the current
drivers. This would reduce congestion and travel time for everyone. In particular,
at the current time (the gray line below the red) only one type would nd prof-
itable to start driving (type 11) i.e. there is at most one marginal agent.
In theory, with the above types and congestion function, the Nash equilibrium with-
out congestion pricing achieves an eciency level of 301.3 experimental dollars
whereas the social optimum achieves an eciency of 406.3 experimental dollars,
an increase of 34.8%. In practice, the eciency level associated with no congestion
price could be lower or higher than the Nash equilibrium eciency. Hence, the ben-
ets, if any, of the message system have to be measured against observed ecien-
cies.
Two main treatments were considered: no price and message price. The rst treat-
ment represents a situation with no congestion prices and the second uses a mech-
anism with weak incentives. The message price treatment uses agents' messages
about their value of time and the observed level of trac to calculate congestion
prices. Trac observations are used to measure the marginal impact, in time, of
adding an extra vehicle to the road. Messages are used to measure the cost of the
marginal increase in time.
Four additional treatments were considered to provide control and robustness to the
ndings. The xed price treatment provides a measure of the maximum observable
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eciency. This treatment considers a social planner with access to all private infor-
mation and imposes the optimal xed congestion price in all rounds. The dynamic
price treatment follows the same structure of the message price, but behaves as if
all agents reported the truth all the time. The balanced treatment considers budget-
balanced versions of the dynamic and message treatments. The random treatment
considers random types instead of the constructed types used in other treatments.
Each treatment was run 6 times.
Every treatment is associated with a hypothesis derived from the theory section.
1. The no congestion price treatment will achieve the theoretical eciency asso-
ciated with no congestion price
2. The xed price treatment will achieve the theoretical optimal eciency
3. The dynamic price treatment will achieve the same eciency as the xed price
treatment
4. There are two hypothesis associated with the message price treatment
(a) Subjects will play an average-truth-telling mean dynamic
(b) The message treatment will achieve the same eciency as the xed price
treatment
5. The balanced treatments will achieve the same eciency as the unbalanced
treatments
6. There are two hypothesis associated with the random treatment
(a) Subjects will play an average-truth-telling mean dynamic
(b) The random treatment will achieve the same level of eciency as the
message price treatment
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To further replicate the large economy environment, every experimental subject
managed ten identical drivers. In every round, each subject decides whether to
drive or not; if he decides to drive, a driver of his type is introduced to the road (up
to ten); if he decides to not drive, a driver is removed from the road (up to zero).
The experiment was run at the Experimental Economics Lab at the University of
Maryland. There were 130 participants, all undergraduate students at the Uni-
versity of Maryland. There were nine sessions. No subject participated in more
than one session. In every session, subjects participated in six dierent treatments.
Treatments were played in random order. Participants were seated in isolated booths.
The experiment is programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
At the beginning of each treatment, each subject was randomly assigned a type,
i.e. a value of commuting D and a value of time v. In addition, they were informed
that in some rounds they could face a congestion price T or a transfer S and that
their experimental payos would depend on the observed time t using the follow-
ing formulas: D − vt
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− T for driving and S for not driving. In all rounds, subjects
could see on screen the current values of T and S, the history of times for all pre-
vious rounds and their private information. In addition, a table with several time
scenarios (t = 5 to t = 85 in steps of 5) with the values for driving and not driving
was provided.
Subjects were informed that in some sections (treatments) they could be asked for
their value of time and were instructed to send one of the available messages.
Subjects were informed that messages would be used to calculate the congestion
price for the next period, but the exact mechanism was not explained because in
the experimental setting, due to the small number of participants, every message
had a measurable impact on the congestion price.
Subjects were explained in detail how earnings were calculated. In every round r,
subjects received xr = (0.9764)30−r (x30 = 1,x1 = 0.5) points for a conditionally
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optimal action and 0 otherwise. This payment scheme fullls two purposes. First,
no Nash equilibrium is favored; remember that for the message treatment there are
many equilibria for this game. Second, it provides incentives for agents to adjust
their strategies over time. Dollar earnings were calculated by adding up all points
and multiplying this quantity by 0.107675. This constant was calculated, and ex-
plained as such, to produce a range from $0 to $14 dollars. In addition, subjects
were paid a $6 show up fee. Subjects received an average payment of $18.28. The
following section present the results of the experiment and gives a general descrip-
tion of some stylized facts.
3.4.1 Experimental results
The results of the experiment are presented in this section. For every treatment,
three dierent dimensions are described: the number of drivers on the road, their
types, and the eciency. The analysis of the results is included in the following sec-
tion.
3.4.1.1 Number of drivers
The main objective of a congestion price is to achieve an ecient congestion level.
In every round, the number of drivers is measured by xs =
∑
xis , where xis is
the proportion of subject i's 10 drivers currently on the road in round s. The Nash
equilibrium quantity of drivers with no congestion price is 10. The socially optimal
quantity of drivers is 6.
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Figure 3.4: Number of drivers with
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Figure 3.5: Number of drivers with
Balanced Dynamic price
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Figure 3.6: Number of drivers with
Fixed price
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Figure 3.7: Number of drivers with
Message price
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Figure 3.8: Number of drivers with
Balanced Message price
The number of drivers of every treatment is shown in gures 3.3 through 3.8. In ev-
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ery gure, every blue dot is the observed number of drivers in each period in each
session. The blue line is the average over sessions. The read line is the simple aver-
age of each blue dot's number of drivers for periods equal or greater than 11.
Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of the number of drivers for the treatment without
congestion pricing. In this treatment, the Nash equilibrium quantity of drivers is
10. In the experiment, 10.03 was observed.
In gure 3.6, the results of the xed congestion price are shown. This treatment
represents the theoretical best option, as it assumes the policy maker knows all the
information, in this case, θ1i and θ2i for every subject. The social optimum is asso-
ciated with 6 drivers. In the experiment, the observed number of drivers was 5.77.
In gure 3.4 the results of the dynamic price are shown. In the experiment, the
number of drivers was 5.96. It can be observed that the number of drivers uctu-
ates less around the average and converges faster to the average value when com-
pared with the xed congestion price or with the no price treatments. In this treat-
ment it is assumed that the policy maker knows vi for every subject and can per-
fectly identify each driver on the road.
Figure 3.7 shows the results for the message price. The observed number of drivers
was 6.92. In this treatment, the policy maker has no information about Di and vi.
Figures 3.5 and 3.8 shown the balanced versions of the dynamic and message price
treatments. It can be observed that the eectiveness of the systems is not decreased
by charging lower congestion prices and distributing all the proceeds to subjects
who decide not to drive. In the balanced dynamic price treatment, the observed
number of drivers is 6.14. In the balanced message price treatment, the observed
number of drivers is 7.01.
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3.4.1.2 Identities
An eective system would not only produce the right level of trac congestion, but
also the right set of drivers. Figures 3.9 through 3.14 are analogous to gure 3.2.
They show the types in a Cartesian plane where the x-axis is the value of time
and the y-axis is the value of commuting. Every blue dot represents a type. The
size and the number next to each dot represent the frequency that type was driving
for periods equal to or greater than eleven. The two gray lines represent the Nash
equilibrium time without congestion price and the social optimum time. The green
line represents the observed average time. When all subjects play a Nash equilib-
rium strategy, the frequency of each blue dot is 100% for types above the green line
and 0% for types below the green line.
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Figure 3.9: Identities with No price

































Figure 3.10: Identities with Dynamic
price

































Figure 3.11: Identities with Balanced
Dynamic price


































Figure 3.12: Identities with Fixed price
































Figure 3.13: Identities with Message
price






























Figure 3.14: Identities with Balanced
Message price
In gure 3.9 the types for the No price treatment are shown. It can be observed
that all types that, in equilibrium, should drive are driving, but not in 100% of the
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periods. On the other hand, some types that should not drive, in equilibrium, drive
some of the periods. In particular, type 11 (value of time = 60.96, value of com-
muting = 82.65) fails to stop driving in 42% of the periods.
In gure 3.12, the xed congestion price has been imposed. The types who would
benet from driving do, but not in 100% of the periods. In particular, type 1 (value
of time = 2.4, value of commuting = 70) drives in 92% of the periods, despite hav-
ing strong incentives to keep driving. Similarly, type 12 (value of time = 77.02,
value of commuting = 76.35) does not drive in 100% of the periods and forgoes pos-
itive payos (and payments).
Figure 3.10 shows the dynamic price treatment. In this treatment, types 1 and 12
display a behavior similar to their behavior in the treatment with the xed con-
gestion price: they fail to drive 100% of the time, despite being protable. In the
xed congestion price treatment, this behavior had consequences only for the sub-
ject making the suboptimal decision. However, in this treatment, their actions had
an impact on the congestion price charged to others. In particular, types 9 (value of
time = 24, value of commuting = 51) and 10 (value of time = 27, value of commut-
ing = 54) beneted from this behavior. On average, when type 12 failed to drive,
despite being protable, types 9 and 10 entered the road.
Figure 3.13 shows the message price treatment. It can be observed that, conditional
on observed times and congestion prices, most types who would benet from driv-
ing do. However, in this treatment type 12 drove even less than in the treatment
with the dynamic price and this opportunity was seized by types 9 and 10. Bal-
anced treatments are shown in gures 3.11 and 3.14.
3.4.1.3 Eciency
Eciency is measured as the sum of experimental payos in very round. Every sub-
ject received two numbers: a value of commuting θ2i and a value of time θ1i. E-
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ciency in round s is dened by Es =
14∑
i=1
(θ2i − θ1i60 ts)xi, where xi is the proportion
of subject i's 10 drivers currently on the road and ts is the observed time in round






xi. All treatments are initialized with xi = 0 for all subjects.
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Figure 3.15: Eciency with No price
Period
















Figure 3.16: Eciency with Dynamic
price
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Figure 3.17: Eciency with Balanced
Dynamic price
Period
















Figure 3.18: Eciency with Fixed
price
Period
















Figure 3.19: Eciency with Message
price
Period
















Figure 3.20: Eciency with Balanced
Message price
The eciency of every treatment is shown in gures 3.15 through 3.20. In every
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gure, every blue dot is the observed eciency in each period in each session. The
blue line is the average over sessions. The read line is the simple average of each
blue dot's eciency for periods equal or greater than 11.
Figure 3.15 shows the evolution of eciency of the treatment without congestion
pricing. In this treatment, the Nash equilibrium is associated with an eciency of
301.3 experimental dollars. In the experiment, the observed eciency was 257.7.
In gure 3.18, the results of the xed congestion price are shown. This treatment
represents the theoretical maximum eciency that can be achieved. It assumes the
policy maker knows all the information, in this case, Di and vi for every subject.
The social optimum achieves an eciency of 406.6 experimental dollars. In the ex-
periment, an eciency of 390.9 was observed.
In gure 3.16 the results of the dynamic price are shown. In the experiment, an ef-
ciency of 393.0 was observed. It can be observed that the eciency uctuates less
around the average and converges faster to the average value. Both characteristics
are consequences of the the stability of the game. In this treatment it is assumed
that the policy maker knows vi for every subject and can perfectly identify each
driver on the road.
Figure 3.19 shows the results for the message price. The observed eciency is 371.4
experimental dollars. This is a high level of eciency, considering the fact that in
this treatment Di and vi are unknown.
Figures 3.17 and 3.20 show the balanced versions of the dynamic and message price
treatments. It can be observed that eciency is not hurt by charging lower conges-
tion prices and distributing all the proceeds to subjects who decide not to drive. In
the balanced dynamic price treatment, the observed eciency is 395.0. In the bal-
anced message price treatment, the observed eciency is 368.8.
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3.4.2 Analysis
This section evaluates the hypothesis derived from the theory. The main objective
of the experiment is to test whether the message system allows drivers to converge
to the socially optimal trac congestion level. Other treatments are design to put
the results of the message price treatment in context. In this section it is considered
that a treatment has converged in period p whenever the average absolute devia-
tion from the mean eciency is less or equal to 5% for all consecutive periods. The
mean eciency in period p is mp = 130−p+1
30∑
i=p
Ei, the absolute deviation in period
w ≥ p with respect to the mean eciency at p is ew,p = |Ew −mp| and the average





. A treatment converged in period p when-
ever es ≤ 5% for all s > p. All treatments, but the no price treatment, converged on
period 6. The no price treatment converged on period 11.
Hypothesis 1. The no congestion price treatment will achieve the theoretical e-
ciency associated with no congestion price
This is a standard hypothesis supported the rational model. The theoretical e-
ciency associated with no congestion price is 301.3 experimental dollars. Figure
3.15 shows that m11 = 257.6. Assuming that Es = m11 + εs, where ε is i.i.d
E[εs] = 0 for all periods s ≥ 11, a t-test was used to evaluate the null hypothe-
sis of m11 = 301.3 versus the alternative m11 6= 301.3. The null was rejected with
condence of 99%. In the experiment, the no congestion price achieved a lower e-
ciency than the rational model. This fact is at odds with a purely rational model of
human behavior. This deviation could have happened in the opposite direction, and
after all, a congestion price might not be needed.
Hypothesis 2. The xed price treatment will achieve the theoretical optimal e-
ciency
This is a standard hypothesis supported the rational model: a social planner would
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be able to solve the congestion problem with a pigouvian price. The theoretical ef-
ciency associated with the optimal congestion is 406.6 experimental dollars. Fig-
ure 3.18 shows that m11 = 390.92. Assuming that Es = m11 + εs, where ε is i.i.d
E[εs] = 0 for all periods s ≥ 11, a t-test was used to evaluate the null hypothe-
sis of m11 = 406.6 versus the alternative m11 < 406.6. The null was rejected with
condence of 99%.
Hypothesis 3. The dynamic price treatment will achieve the same eciency as
the xed price treatment
The message treatment diers from the xed price treatment in two aspects: it
changes over time and depends on reports. The dynamic price treatment bridges
these dierences by changing over time, but is independent of agents' reports. Con-
gestion prices in this treatment behave as if all subjects told the truth all the time.
Figure 3.16 shows that eciency observed in the dynamic message treatment was
m11 = 393. A paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to evaluate the null hy-
pothesis that the dierences between the dynamic price and the xed price ecien-
cies were symmetric around zero. This test does not require additional assumptions
about error terms. The null was not rejected (p > 10%).
The eciency results of the no price and xed price treatments show that the con-
clusions of the rational model are likely to fail in a real-world situation. The results
from the xed price and dynamic price treatments are evidence that theoretical e-
ciencies might not be achievable in real life.
Hypothesis 4.b The message treatment will achieve the same eciency as the
xed price treatment
Figure 3.19 shows that the message treatment achieved an average eciency m11 =
371.36. A paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to evaluate the null hypoth-
esis that the dierences between the message price and the xed price eciencies
were symmetric around zero. The null was not rejected (p > 10%). The eciency
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observed in this treatment is 95% of the eciency achievable by a social planner
with full information.
Hypothesis 5 The balanced treatments will achieve the same eciency as the un-
balanced treatments
Figures 3.17 and 3.20 show the results of the balanced treatments. The balanced
dynamic price treatment obtained an average eciency m11 = 395.03. The balanced
message price treatment obtained an average eciency m11 = 368.84. In both cases,
the null hypothesis was that the balanced treatments would achieve an eciency
equal to their unbalanced versions. The null hypothesis was not rejected in both
cases (p > 10%).
Table 3.2 contains a summary of the mean eciency achieved in every treatment
as a percentage of the mean eciency obtained by the xed tax treatment. The
standard deviation has been scaled accordingly. The table in the middle contains
p-values for the null hypothesis that the row treatment and the column treatment
have the same eciency against the alternative that the row has a higher eciency.
A paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used. The lower portion of the table shows
the results for the number of drivers on the road. Estimates of the average number
of drivers have not been scaled because units represent subjects' decisions directly.
P-values are also reported for the number of drivers. The alternative hypothesis is
that the row treatment has a lower number of drivers than the column treatment.
The last column shows ep, and an analogous measure for the number of drivers, for
every treatment. All estimates are calculated using data from periods 11 to 30.
Figures 3.21 and 3.22 show estimates for eciency and the number of drivers for
dierent choices of initial period of analysis. All treatments are signicantly (p-
values < 1% for all periods of analysis) more ecient than the no price treatment.
Dynamic treatments and the xed treatment achieve a signicantly (p-values < 1%
for all periods of analysis) higher eciency than message treatments. 95% con-
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Period Treatment Measure Mean SD Epsilon
11 No Price eciency 65.91% 13.01% 4.88%
11 Fixed eciency 100.00% 4.12% 1.19%
11 Dynamic eciency 100.53% 3.26% 1.14%
11 Message eciency 95.00% 3.44% 1.14%
11 Bdynamic eciency 101.05% 2.85% 0.91%
11 Bmessage eciency 94.35% 4.86% 1.94%
11 No Price N. of Drivers 10.030 0.323 15.44%
11 Fixed N. of Drivers 5.770 0.493 22.74%
11 Dynamic N. of Drivers 5.963 0.202 22.31%
11 Message N. of Drivers 6.926 0.356 22.36%
11 Bdynamic N. of Drivers 6.147 0.214 25.84%
11 Bmessage N. of Drivers 7.015 0.606 17.06%
Table 3.1: Estimates for period ≥ 11
Period Treatment Measure No Price Fixed Dynamic Message Bdynamic Bmessage
11 No Price eciency
11 Fixed eciency <1% <1% <1%
11 Dynamic eciency <1% <1% <1%
11 Message eciency <1%
11 Bdynamic eciency <1% <1% <1% <1%
11 Bmessage eciency <1%
11 No Price N. of Drivers
11 Fixed N. of Drivers <1% <1% <1% <1% <1%
11 Dynamic N. of Drivers <1% <1% <1% <1%
11 Message N. of Drivers <1%
11 Bdynamic N. of Drivers <1% <1% <1%
11 Bmessage N. of Drivers <1%
Table 3.2: P values for estimates for period ≥ 11
dence interval are shown in Figures 3.23 and 3.24.
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Figure 3.21: Eciency estimates by
period
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Figure 3.22: No. of Drivers estimates
by period
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Figure 3.23: 95% Condence Inter-
vals for eciency estimates. Blue: No
price; Red: Message; Orange: Fixed
Period




















Figure 3.24: 95% Condence Inter-
vals for Number of Drivers estimates.
Blue: No price; Red: Message; Or-
ange: Fixed
3.4.2.1 Message Congestion Price
This section describes the observed messages and conrms that subjects followed
an average truth-telling mean dynamic, hence the high levels of eciency. In princi-
ple, even assuming that subjects would play a Nash equilibrium, eciency gains are
not guaranteed. Figure 3.25 shows the eciency levels of all Nash equilibria in the






Figure 3.25: Nash Equilibria Eciency by average message
In gure 3.25, when all subjects send the lowest possible value of time, the con-
gestion price is suciently low to be completely ineective i.e. the Nash equilib-
rium with no congestion price is also a Nash equilibrium of the message congestion
price system. However, as argued before, the nal outcome of the system does not
only depend on its Nash equilibria, but also (and more importantly) on the non-
equilibrium behavior. In particular, the outcome of the system is tied to the aggre-
gate message, which is determined by individual messages.
Figure 3.26 shows the average message sent by type. Types who drive in the so-
cial optimum are shown in blue, types who do not drive in the social optimum are
shown in gray. It can be observed that those types who drive in the social optimum
send higher messages than those who don't.19 In addition, it can be observed that
some types send higher values than their true values while other types do the op-
posite. Figure 3.27 shows the number of times a particular message was received
by the system as a proportion of the total number of messages received. It can be
observed that the lowest and highest messages are the most often used.
19The mean message sent by those types who drive in the optimal allocation is 29.64 (30.17),
the mean message for other types is 16.06 (24.21). The average message of the optimal group is
greater with a condence level of 99% using a Welch's t-test.
105
Value of Time
























Figure 3.26: Average Message Sent
by Type
Message















Figure 3.27: Messages Received
Individual messages are important, but they have a very limited impact on the sys-
tem's outcome, as the congestion price depends on the average message. Figures
3.28 and 3.29 show the relationship between the average message and the real aver-
age message, as if all subjects reported their true value of time. Figure 3.28 shows
their evolution over time (all sessions aggregated) and gure 3.29 shows all data
points.
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Figure 3.28: Average Message over
time
Figure 3.29: Real vs Sent Average
Message
In the previous two gures, two stylized facts about the average message are readily
observable: (i) the population understates its value of time, (ii) but not to the low-
est possible extent. These behavioral regularities guarantee eciency gains in the
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message treatment. Consider the unconditional distribution of messages sent G and
let z∗ be the equilibrium average message when all drivers send their true value of
time. Since average sent messages are smaller than average real messages we have
that G(z∗) = 1 i.e. the highest observed average message will always be below the
real equilibrium average message. Let f(z) be the achieved eciency when z is sent
to the system. Then, unless G is degenerate, E[f(z)] > f(0) i.e. the implementa-
tion of the message system is guaranteed to generate eciency gains, unlike policy
guesses about the value of time.20 Figures 3.30 and 3.31 shows the empirical uncon-
ditional density and distribution.
Figure 3.30: Density of Average
Message
Figure 3.31: Distribution of Average
Message
The average message can explain that the observed eciency gains are positive,
but not their high level. In theory, whenever agents play an average truth-telling
mean dynamic in the presence of the message congestion price, the ecient out-
come is expected. Recall from previous sections that a mean dynamic V̂ : X̂ →
R|Θ|×|S×Θ| describes what actions and messages are sent and the mean dynamic
Vθs(x) =
∑
θ̂ xθsθ̂ describes all actions as if all agents reported the truth.
20As an example, suppose G is uniform, then the minimum eciency of the message system




Hypothesis 4.a Subjects will play an average-truth-telling mean dynamic in the
message price treatment.
An average truth-telling mean dynamic is characterized by one inequality: 0 <








θ1dxθd) whenever V (x) 6= 0.
This is the covariance between the direction taken by agents and the direction of
greatest increase on welfare. Proposition 5 shows that as long as this covariance is
positive, agents are guaranteed to arrive to the social optimum. Figures 3.32 and
3.33 show observed covariance in the message price treatment. Every observation
is calculated as
∑







t = 1 . . . 30. A binomial test was used to reject the hypothesis that the covariance
was zero against the alternative of being greater than zero. The null was rejected
at a condence level of 99%. Figures 3.34 and 3.35 show the covariance for the no
price treatment. The null was not rejected (p-value >10%).







































histogram - message treatment
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histogram - no price treatment
3.4.3 Robustness
The experimental design pursued in this paper relied on a particular selection of
types. However, it is important to test the robustness of the message price mecha-
nism to dierent sets of types. Figure 3.36 shows the eciency achieved in six dif-
ferent random treatments in which 14 subjects received a random value of time and
a random value of commuting, both sampled from a uniform distribution with sup-
port [1, 100]. These random treatments are otherwise identical to the message price
treatment discussed above.
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Figure 3.36: Eciency of Random Treatments
Figures 3.37 to 3.48 show the experimental results of every random treatment. Fig-
ures on the left display driving frequency by type. Those types who drive in the
social optimum are depicted in orange. Figures on the right show eciency over
time.
Hypothesis 6.a. Subjects will play an average-truth-telling mean dynamic
Hypothesis 6.b. The random treatment will achieve the same level of eciency as
the message price treatment
The following table shows the average eciency achieved. The message price treat-
ment achieved an eciency of 91.46% (3.31%) (with respect to the theoretical op-
timum). A Welch's t-test was used to test the null hypothesis that the eciency in
each random treatment is equal to 91.46% against the alternative that the eciency
in the random treatment was smaller. In all random treatments, but the third, the
null was not rejected i.e. the message congestion price performed equally on ran-
dom types as in designed types. A binomial test was used to reject the hypothesis
that the covariance was zero against the alternative of being greater than zero.
Random treatments 2 and 3 highlight the importance of the careful selection of
types in the main message treatment. In random treatment 2 the Nash equilib-
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Random Mean SD Equilibrium Message price Avg-truth-telling
1 94.92% 3.74% 77.90% >10% <1%
2 97.51% 0.86% 93.75% >10% 5%
3 72.21% 2.53% 63.34% <1% 5%
4 98.96% 1.38% 91.51% >10% <1%
5 91.48% 1.37% 82.89% >10% 2.13%
6 95.38% 0.88% 67.66% >10% 2.13%
Table 3.3: Random Types Eciency for Periods 11-30
rium eciency without congestion pricing is high, reducing the potential gains of
the message mechanism and hence the ability to identify them. Random treatment
3, on the other hand, displays 4 types who are aligned and hence poorly represent a
situation with a large number of drivers.
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Figure 3.37: Types Random Treatment
1


































Figure 3.38: Types Random Treatment
2



































Figure 3.39: Types Random Treatment
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Figure 3.40: Eciency Random Treat-
ment 1












Figure 3.41: Eciency Random Treat-
ment 2












Figure 3.42: Eciency Random Treat-
ment 3
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Figure 3.43: Types Random Treatment
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Figure 3.44: Types Random Treatment
5





































Figure 3.45: Types Random Treatment
6












Figure 3.46: Eciency Random Treat-
ment 4












Figure 3.47: Eciency Random Treat-
ment 5
















A social planner would like a socially optimal outcome x∗(θ) to be chosen in every
state of the world θ ∈ Θ. In general, this can be done in two steps: i) using a mech-
anism M to make x∗(θ) a rational choice (a Nash equilibrium), and ii) providing
M with nice properties that facilitate coordination in x∗(θ). This has been the ob-
jective of mechanism design.21 However, most mechanisms assume that agents are
fully rational all the time and possess common knowledge of types and the struc-
ture of the game induced by the mechanism. These assumptions have proven ex-
tremely useful and powerful as they have allowed the study of very complex prob-
lems as well as the development of many successful mechanisms, but has well iden-
tied limitations.
This paper addresses one of those limitations by incorporating behavioral traits as
a mechanism designer tool and showing that it can be as eective as strong incen-
tive properties in solving social problems.
The introduction of behavioral traits to the mechanism design framework enables
the study of questions typically outside the scope of the purely rational model: Are
mechanisms with the same incentive properties equally eective?22 Are incentives
more eective the stronger they are?23 Are incentives more eective the simpler
they are?24 What considerations, other than incentives, aect the eectiveness of a
21Maskin (2008)
22There might be two ecient and incentive compatible mechanisms for the same problem, of
which only one is eective.
23A measure of incentive strength could be the dierence in payo between truth-telling and the
best misrepresentation.
24Consider, for example, truth-telling as a dominant strategy and as a Nash equilibrium, the
former being simpler.
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mechanism?25 When is it ecient to provide incentives?26 Can non-incentive com-
patible mechanisms be more eective than incentive compatible ones?27
The answers to these questions will most likely unveil an intricate relationship be-
tween rational incentives and behavioral traits, opening the door to new methods
for solving problems in practice.
3.6 Appendix
Proposition 3.1. There is an ecient mechanism with weak incentives, namely
the wVCG.
Proof. Let x∗be an ecient prole of actions and θ be the true prole of types.
Suppose all agents other than i select x∗j and report their true type θj. For i, the







hwi (x−i, θ−i) which is maximized by selection x
∗
i as an action and θi as a report.
Proposition 3.2. There is a budget balanced mechanism with weak incentives for
any prole of actions. In particular, any ecient prole of actions can be supported
as a budget balanced Nash equilibrium.





i , x−i), θj), thus pi(x
0, θ) = 0 for all i ∈ N and θ ∈ Θ. In particular, let
x0 = x ∈ x∗(θ), then the ecient prole of actions can be supported as a budget
balanced Nash equilibrium.
25For example, a mechanism that converges to the ecient Nash equilibrium under a wide class
of behavioral procedures have a better change of being eective than a mechanism that cannot
guarantee such convergence.
26Usually, the eciency of a mechanism is measured by the eciency attained within the mech-
anism i.e. by the outcome it produces, however, this measure leaves other considerations out of
the analysis. For example, how expensive is to implement and run the mechanism.
27It is possible that some eective mechanisms support x∗(θ) as a non-equilibrium but sensible
prole of actions.
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Proposition 3.3. Any ecient prole of actions can be supported as a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of a sequential mechanism with weak incentives.
Proof. The timing is as follows: i) agents select an action, ii) the prole of actions
is revealed, and iii) agents send a report. Suppose a prole of actions x was chosen
in the rst stage of the game. Suppose other agents have sent θ−i, sending report θ′i




−i, θj)− hwi (x−i, θ−i),
hence sending θi is a best response. Thus θ constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the
second stage. Suppose agents have chosen x∗−i in the rst stage, the payo asso-







−i, θj) − hwi (x−i, θ−i), hence i maximizes his payo by
selecting x∗i as an action. Thus (x
∗, θ) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.







xθjθ1j for all θ ∈ Θ and
s ∈ S and V an admissible mean dynamic such that V (x) · ∇W (x) > 0 whenever
V (x) 6= 0, then every solution trajectory of V converges to the ecient distribution
of actions x∗.
Proof. Let x : R+ → X be a solution trajectory of V , then all of its accumulation
points are critical points of W ◦ x. Since W is concave it has a unique maximizer x∗
and ∇W (x) = 0 only when x = x∗. x∗ is also the unique Nash equilibrium. Since
V (x) · ∇W (x) > 0 whenever V (x) 6= 0, then x∗ becomes the only accumulation
point of W ◦ x (since it is a monotone function).
Proposition 3.5. Let V̂ be an average truth-telling mean dynamic, then the mech-







x̂θjθ1j converges to the
ecient x∗distribution of actions.
Proof. The induced mean dynamic V satises all the assumptions of the previous
theorem, hence x will converge to x∗. Thus actions will converge to the ecient
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